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THE COST OF THE VOTE: POLL TAXES,




The election of Barack Obama as the forty-fourth President of the
United States represents both the completion of a historical campaign
season and a triumph of the Civil Rights revolution of the twentieth cen-
tury. President Obama's 2008 campaign, along with the campaigns of
Senators Hillary Rodham Clinton and John McCain, was remarkable in
both the identities of the politicians themselves' and the attention they
brought to the political process. In particular, Obama attracted voters
from populations which have not been traditionally represented in na-
tional politics. His run was hallmarked, in large part, by significant gras-
sroots fundraising, a concerted effort to generate popular appeal, and,
most important, massive voter turnout efforts.2 As a result, this election
cycle generated significant increases in participation during the primary
season.3 Turnout in the general election did not meet anticipated record
t Legal Writing Instructor, Howard University School of Law. J.D., M.A., Duke Universi-
ty, 2000. An early version of this paper was presented at the Writer's Workshop of the Legal Writ-
ing Institute in summer 2007. Later versions were presented at the November 2007 Howard Univer-
sity School of Law faculty colloquy and the September 2008 Northeast People of Color Legal Scho-
larship Conference. I gratefully acknowledge Andrew Taslitz, Sherman Rogers, Derek Black, Pau-
lette Caldwell, Phoebe Haddon, and Daniel Tokaji for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of
this paper. I am also grateful for the thoughtful conversations I have had on this topic with James
Coleman, Okainer Christian Dark, Lydie Pierre-Louis, Jena Martin, and Josephine Ross. I am in-
debted to James Nichols and Rae Cousins for their excellent research assistance. I also wish to
express my appreciation to Dean Kurt Schmoke of the Howard University School of Law for his
thoughtful comments and for providing research support for this effort.
I. Mr. Obama is the first American of African descent to be elected to the chief executive.
This is a great feat given the historic status of African Americans throughout the history of European
presence in North America. In particular, it represents a transformation from the period of the histo-
ry of the United States where the policy of Jim Crow treated African Americans as second class
citizens. See infra Part II. Yet, Mr. Obama clearly was not the only candidate to make history in
this campaign season. Senator Clinton, though not the first woman to be considered for nomination
by a major party, was nonetheless a serious contender for the Democratic nomination. Additionally,
Senator McCain was among the oldest nominees of a major party for the office.
2. The voter turnout effort by the Obama campaign was noted early on as a hallmark of its
general electoral strategy. See Alec MacGiUis & Jennifer Agiesta, For Obama, Hurdles in Expand-
ing Black Vote, WASH. POST, July 28, 2008, at A01. Indeed, this turnout effort focused on African
American voters and younger voters; increases in the participation of these groups were thought to
create significant opportunities for the Democratic campaign to be more competitive in close elec-
toral states. Id.
3. Turnout reached an eight year high in thirty-six of the forty states that hold primaries.
Nearly fifty-eight million Americans participated in those primaries. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES,
2008 PRIMARY IN REvIEw 4, 6 (2008), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/
Primary%202008%20FINAL.pdf.
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levels, 4 but nonetheless it represented levels of participation higher than
in 2004.5 Moreover, Mr. Obama appealed to a broad range of people
across the political spectrum; this led to his substantial popular vote ma-
jority and an electoral vote landslide for President Obama.
This election represents a sea-change from a time as recent as fifty
years ago when southern state governments used devices like poll taxes
and literacy tests to remove the poor, and specifically African Ameri-
cans, from the voter rolls.7 Some of those voters who seek to register
today would have been shut out of the polls by these devices designed
with the intent of limiting the numbers of African Americans who could
register and vote. In large part, the Civil Rights revolution focused on
making the ballot box accessible to all.8 Ultimately, the legal advocacy
part of the revolution won significant victories in a series of cases where
the Supreme Court repeatedly announced a right to vote available to all
citizens.9
The Supreme Court's rhetoric of a "right to vote" stands in contrast
with modern concerns regarding voter access. Even before the 2008
election, the question of access to the polls was alive and well and a pox
on American elections in the late twentieth century. In the controversial
presidential election of 2000, one of the major disputes concerned
whether voters were illegally purged from the polls. Advocates con-
tended that the polls in Florida were unjustly and unfairly being purged
4. This appeared to be the case notwithstanding the use of early voting and the long lines on
Election Day. Kate Phillips, Rate of Voter Turnout May Not Be a Record, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2008, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/voter-turnmout-not-near-a-record-yethfo/; see
also The Pew Ctr. on the States, Electionline Weekly, Dec. 11, 2008, http://tinyurl.com/cw665o
(noting that turnout in 2008 was significant but did not achieve a record for turnout in American
presidential elections).
5. United States Elections Project, 2008 Unofficial Voter Turnout,
http://elections.gmu.edu/preliminary-vote..2008.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2009). Turnout for the
2008 General Election among eligible voters was 61.7% or 131.3 million votes cast. This
represented an increase of 1.6% over the 60.1% turnout rate for the 2004 presidential election. Id.
6. See Alec MacGillis & Jon Cohen, A Vote Decided by Big Turnout and Big Discontent
with GOP, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2008, at A27. Significantly, the substantial amount of expected
turnout from younger voters and from African Americans did not materialize in record numbers. Id.
7. For a discussion of the operation of the poll tax, see C. VANN WOODWARD, A HISTORY OF
THE SOUTH: 9 ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913, at 331-35 (Wendell Holmes Stephenson &
E. Merton Coulter eds., 1951). For a thorough single volume that has analyzed the operation of the
poll tax, see FREDERIC D. OGDEN, THE POLL TAX IN THE SOUTH (1958). For a history of the pattern
of disenfranchisement throughout the south, see J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN
POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, (1974).
8. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 257-268 (2000) (discussing history of the Civil Rights Move-
ment and voting rights movements from the 1950s through the 1960s); see also Paula D. McClain,
Michael C. Brady, Niambi M. Carter, Efren 0. Perez, & Victoria M. DeFrancesco Soto, Rebuilding
Black Voting Rights before the Voting Rights Act, in THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: SECURING THE
BALLOT 57, 70-72 (Richard M. Valelly ed., 2006) (discussing Freedom Vote and Freedom Summer
campaigns which led to voting rights reform legislation).
9. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("The right to vote freely for the
candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right
strike at the heart of representative government.").
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of minority voters due to felon disenfranchisement laws, inaccurate
record-keeping, and other practices that were meant to keep African
American voters from the polls.1t These allegations were raised aside
from the issue of election maladministration rasied before the Supreme
Court in Bush v. Gore.t And if these allegations are taken to be true,
their alleged consequences had significant results-the decisive results in
Florida were so narrow that a difference of several thousand votes could
have made Al Gore the winner of the 2000 presidential election rather
than George W. Bush.
1 2
Eight years after Bush v. Gore, more questions have emerged about
the nature and quality of our election system. One fundamental question
that has garnered significant attention is the issue of what criteria ought
to be used to qualify voters. This question has most recently presented
itself through voter identification laws enacted in a number of states.
These laws require that voters possess government-issued identification
cards with photographs as a prerequisite to registering to vote and voting
in person at the polls. The Supreme Court has recently endorsed the use
of photo identification laws, finding that the voter identification statute
passed in Indiana law was, on its face, a reasonable election regulation.
3
This article argues that photo identification laws represent a contin-
uation of the use of economic forces as a way to block people of lower
economic status from participation in the electorate. These laws are sim-
ilar to other restrictions on the franchise, such as property requirements
and poll taxes, because the rules required the voter to demonstrate the
ability to meet an economic test-the ability to show a certain property
10. African Americans were nearly ten times more likely than whites to have their ballots
rejected in the November 2000 election. Poorer counties, particularly those with large minority
populations, were more likely to use voting systems with higher spoilage rates than more affluent
counties with significant white populations. Of the 100 precincts in Florida with the highest num-
bers of disqualified ballots, eighty-three of them were majority black precincts. Thirty-one percent
of the Florida disenfranchised population consisted of African American men. The report also
suggested that Florida's electoral reform law, recently enacted at the time the study was conducted,
failed to change the state's policy of permanently disenfranchising former felons, which produced a
stark disparity in disenfranchisement rates of African American men compared with their white
counterparts. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVtL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE
2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, at ch. 9 (2001), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubslvote2000/
report/ch9.htm.
11. 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000). Richard Hasen points out that the Bush v. Gore decision pro-
vided an opportunity for the country to become aware of the systemic problems which plague the
electoral system and to apply the principles articulated in Reynolds and Harper to addressing current
problems in election administration. See also Richard Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore,
60 STAN. L. REv. 1, 43 (2007). Yet, Hasen notes that nonetheless the spectre of partisanship has
effectively allowed the politicians and the courts to relegate their post Bush v. Gore decisions to
default rles which represent a furthering of partisan retrenchments. Id. at 43-44.
12. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at intro., available at
http:llwww.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/reportlintro.htm ('"The final vote tally in Florida was 2,912,790
for Bush and 2,912,253 for Gore. In the end, Bush became the president-elect, winning the Electoral
College by a margin of 271-267; Gore won the popular vote with 50,158,094 over Bush's
49,820,518.").
13. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1627 (2008).
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value, the ability to pay a tax, or the ability to obtain a photo ID. The
potential effect of such photo-voter identification laws is that the voters
at the lowest end of the socioeconomic scale are effectively excluded
from voting because they are the least able to afford the cost of voting
exacted by the law.
History has shown that the indirect, non-essential costs of voting are
subject to manipulation by political elites such as state legislators and
political party leaders as a means to shape the electorate to ensure that it
will be composed of voters more disposed to vote for those same law-
makers and party leaders. Thus, laws that rely on socioeconomic status
to define eligibility to vote have served-and currently risk becoming,
once again-a proxy for the exclusion of otherwise eligible voters from
the electorate. This article contends that such lines of exclusion are anti-
thetical to the nature of democracy and ultimately constitute a tyranny of
the majority 14 against the minority at the lowest level of socioeconomic
status.1 5 Moreover, the courts have been largely indifferent to this effect.
The Supreme Court, in particular, has articulated a powerful vision of
participatory democracy, but has at the same time been apathetic towards
the effective exclusion of those on the lower end of the economic scale.
This is most clearly shown in the recent Supreme Court decision in
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.
The American system, unlike many other constitutional democra-
cies, requires that the voter have sufficient socioeconomic status in order
14. ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 239-42 (Harvey C. Mansfield and
Debla Winthrop trans., eds., Univ. Chi. Press 2000) (1835). The concept of the tyranny of the ma-
jority lies close to American democracy. Majority rule is the key thesis of the United States Consti-
tution. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (Har-
vard Univ. Press 1980) (1938). Yet, the danger of rule of the majority is that the majority can then
trample on the rights of the minority. Id. This is often envisioned as a problem of express minority
discrimination in terms of race, gender, political factions, etc. Yet, the problem of economic exclu-
sion in the electorate is one of implicit discrimination. There is no group advocating for the rights of
those left out of the electorate due to photo identification laws. Yet, the exclusion of them-and the
inability to have their voice heard in the process of American govemance-is wholly antithetical to
democracy. It is this kind of majoritarian tyranny which this article attempts to name.
15. The underlying principle here is the view that the democratic process must include all
citizens without distinction as to any category, including class, for American democracy to be mea-
ningful. Distinctions on the basis of class ought not play a role in the question of who can partici-
pate in American democracy, i.e., who is allowed to vote. This view is as old as the republic itself.
Indeed, the idea that class ought not to play a role was recognized as a part of the constitutional
debates. See THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 348 (James Madison) (Bantham Books 2003) (1787-88)
("Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the
learned, more than the ignorant .... The electors are to be the great body of the people of the Unit-
ed States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in every State of electing the correspond-
ing branch of the legislature of the State."); see also ELY, supra note 14, at 5-6 (noting that the
Constitution is fundamentally a document designed to guarantee a system of representative democ-
racy where all citizens are entitled to participate); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust:
How Courts can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L. J. 1279, 1282
(2005) (noting that the root of democratic reinforcement theory was the notion that democracy is the
premise of the Constitution-that "all adults must have the right to vote and to engage in expressive
activities").
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to participate in the electorate. 16 This dynamic has been true throughout
the history of the American electorate. The history of the administration
of voting laws and the evolution of voting rights illustrates how various
types of costs lie at the heart of the rules created to determine who could
vote and who could not vote.17 The greatest external cost-that is, out-
side of the voter's own motivational costs to vote-is exacted by those
rules and regulations created by governments to administer elections. 
8
Thus, the history of the right to vote has been a steady struggle be-
tween those who wish to constrain or restrict the vote by raising the cost
and those who wish to make the vote more accessible by lowering the
costs. Moreover, this history represents a political struggle where the
bedrock of democratic systems-the ability for each and every eligible
citizen to have his or her vote counted without effective manipulation by
the political majority-is left prey to the calculations of politicians at-
tempting to game the electorate. The effect is that a set of voters is left
susceptible to this manipulation and is effectively excluded from voting.
Even within the regime of voter identification laws, there are those who
are excluded from the process and unable to participate due to the shift-
ing of the rules. Some advocates have called this "structural disenfran-
chisement."' 9 The effect of such disenfranchisement is the creation of an
underclass of citizens who are unable to vote and who will remain mar-
ginalized.
Little attention has been given to these issues by the law review lite-
rature.20 This paper will argue that voting rights jurisprudence must fac-
16. See SIDNEY VERBA, NORMAN H. NIE & JAE-ON KIM, PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL
EQUALITY: A SEVEN-NATION COMPARISON 2-3 (1978) (discussing the comparison of seven nations
which confirms a correlation between socioeconomic status and political participation specifically in
the United States as opposed to the other six nations); see also RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN
J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 13-36 (1980).
17. See Keyssar, supra note 8, at 9-10, 28-31, 35-37, 61-62, 111-12 (discussing laws that were
put into place to disenfranchise poor and minority voters).
18. See id. Indeed, it almost goes without saying that the ability or right to vote only exists
within the context of the laws and regulations which define the exercise of that right and thus, the
rules themselves define who can and cannot vote. See SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY:
THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION 13-15 (2006) (asserting that the election law system
dictates who can vote-that the "election rules, practices, and decisions filters out certain citizens
from voting and organizes the electorate... there is no right to vote outside of the terms, conditions,
hurdles, and boundaries set by" those responsible for enacting election laws).
19. See, e.g., STEVEN DONZIGER, AMERICA'S MODERN POLL TAX: How STRUCTURAL
DISENFRANCHISEMENT ERODES DEMOCRACY 1 (2001), available at http://www.advancement
project.org/reports/AMPT.pdf.
20. This is not to say that there has not been a great deal of commentary about photo identifi-
cation requirements. This commentary has been led by Spencer Overton's seminal article which has
greatly influenced discussion in this field. See Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 631, 631 (2007). Additionally, there has been a significant amount of law review commentary
analyzing photo identification voter requirements. See, e.g., Richard Tyler Atkinson, Note, Under-
developed and Overexposed: Rethinking Photo ID Voting Requirements, 33 J. LEGIS. 268, 268
(2007); Kelly T. Brewer, Note, Disenfranchise This: VoterlD Laws and Their Discontents, A Blue-
print for Bringing Successful Equal Protection and Poll Tax Claims, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 191, 191-
92 (2007); Chad Flanders, How to Think About Voter Fraud (and Why), 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 93,
93 (2007); Samuel P. Langholz, Note, Fashioning a Constitutional Voter-Identification Require-
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tor in these express costs-whether direct or indirect-to ensure that
American elections are free, fair, and accessible by all willing partici-
pants. Part I of this article will provide an overview of American photo
identification laws and discuss the nature of the modem cost of voting to
the voter. It will draw upon political science voter participation theory
and demonstrate that voting registration and identification laws create
inherent burdens on voters and that those burdens are largely socioeco-
nomic in nature. Part II of this article will discuss the history of voter
access laws in this country. That history has been premised on the idea
that voter access laws rely on economic status as a sufficient identifier
for those who have a sufficient stake in the electorate and thus are de-
serving of the exercise of the franchise. This part will conclude with a
discussion of Harper, which held that the ability to pay bears no rational
relationship with the ability to vote and clearly articulated a vision of a
fundamental right to vote. Part III will consider the potential socioeco-
nomic impact of photo identification laws upon voters and how those
impacts are similar to historical class-based discrimination. It will ex-
amine in detail how the courts have been indifferent to the costs levied
upon on the right to vote by voter identification laws and how that indif-
ference tracks the conflict over the socioeconomic burdens of voting
raised in Harper. Finally, Part IV will recommend how to reframe the
standards articulated in Harper to take into account this structural so-
cioeconomic bias inherent in, and damaging to, the right to vote.
I. THE COST OF VOTING TO THE VOTER
The history of the American franchise has been one of a tension be-
tween those who wish to protect the vote from being freely accessed and
those who wish to have the vote defined more liberally to include a
broader cross section of the American public. This tension has been the
hallmark of battles over how to define the right to vote and who would
have access to it. Photographic identification laws represent the latest
ment, 93 IOWA L. REv. 731, 733 (2008); Debra Milberg, The National Identification Debate: "Real
ID'" and Voter Identification, 3 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SoC'Y 443, 444 (2008); Evan D. Mont-
gomery, The Missouri Photo-ID Requirement for Voting: Ensuring Both Access and Integrity, 72
Mo. L. RFV. 651, 651-52 (2007); Demian A. Ordway, Note, Disenfranchisement and the Constitu-
tion: Finding a Standard that Works, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1174, 1174 (2007); E. Earl Parson &
Monique McLaughlin, The Persistence of Racial Bias in Voting: Voter ID, The New Battleground
for Pretextual Race Neutrality, 8 J. L SOC'Y 75, 76 (2007); David Schultz, Less Than Fundamental:
The Myth of Voter Fraud and the Coming of the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 485 (2008).
While this commentary provides a sound analysis concerning voter identification laws and
the impact that photo ID laws will have on the voting public, the commentary does not connect the
litigation surrounding voter identification laws with a broader historical understanding of the mani-
pulation of election laws through the use of economic forces. Nor does the extant literature raise
concerns about the danger to the nature of democracy created by the problems exemplified by photo
identification laws-that the poor (especially poor ethnic minorities) may be excluded from the
democratic process through structural, economics-based means, and that such discrimination is
contradictory to basic conceptions of democracy. This article makes an initial attempt to provide
both analyses.
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manifestation of this tension. These laws, in effect, create an economic
barrier which the lowest economic classes in our society cannot surpass.
This section of the article will begin by discussing basic conceptions of
democracy and provide a framework for thinking about the range of
modem voter identification laws and define the kinds of costs such laws
impose on voters.
A. Democracy and Citizen Access
The notion that all citizens will be allowed to participate in the se-
lection of our leaders lies at the heart of the concept of American democ-
racy.21 This core principle seems almost axiomatic to discourse about
democracy, yet it is not often articulated in a concrete way. Part of the
problem is that the notion of democracy applicable to the American po-
litical scheme often eludes definition.22 Yet, as a basic principle, it
would seem that the involvement of the people in making decisions con-
cerning their choices as to whom may govern lies at the heart of the con-
ception of democracy.23 A close examination of the founding documents
of the United States reveals that the key principle the founders sought to
protect was a democratic process. The Declaration of Independence, in
its appeal to fundamental principles of government, places the people-
without differentiation-as the source of the authority of government.24
Further, the Constitution points to the importance of the principle of par-
ticipation by the people as at the heart of the American experiment.25
The Supreme Court, accordingly, has, as a manifestation of this
principle, recognized the right to vote within the scope of rights guaran-
teed American citizens. Yet in its jurisprudence this right was initially
located with the states rather than the federal government and, according-
ly, the Court did not recognize the right to vote as fundamental or invi-
21. The basic premise of republican democracy is that the citizens will have the opportunity to
participate in electoral process and have a say in choosing their representatives. See Marci A. Ham-
ilton & Clemens G. Kohnen, The Jurisprudence of Information Flow: How the Constitution Con-
structs the Pathways ofinformation, 25 CARDOzO L. REv. 267, 278 (2003).
22. Jane Schacter explains that multiple meanings of the idea of democracy can be derived
from the constitution. See Jane S. Schacter, Unenumerated Democracy: Lessons From the Right to
Vote, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L 457, 472-73 (2007) (explaining in the context of using 'democracy' as a
value which can be defined as an unenumerated right, different perspectives can be reasonably
discerned from the Constitution which may be contradictory).
23. The bedrock principle of such an American democratic process is that the rule of the
country must be in line with the consent of the governed. See ELY, supra note 14, at 7. This is
democracy put most simply. Ely, in particular, argues persuasively that such protection of democra-
cy is at the heart of American governance and the government must be constrained by that principle.
See id.
24. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed .... ").
25. Ely argues persuasively that a close examination of the Constitution itself reveals a con-
cern for creating and protecting a democratic process. See ELY, supra note 14, at 92-93.
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olate.26 However, in the Warren Court era, the Court recognized that the
right to vote was a fundamental federal right. The Court of that era de-
termined that the right to vote was fundamental because, without it, all
other rights of citizenship could be damaged.27 It then follows that with-
out the ability of each citizen to vote and thus have the bedrock amount
of participation in the democratic process and in our government, the
concept of democracy is meaningless. Moreover, minorities from vari-
ous groups have struggled against the majority over the past two hundred
thirty-plus years to create access to the electoral process. With such
access comes the ability to cast a ballot and participate in the core act of
democracy-selecting representatives who will, on the local, state, and
national levels, dictate policy reflective of the needs and interests of all
its citizens.28 Thus, to preserve the core of American democracy, the
mechanisms of voting and political participation should be accessible to
all. Accordingly, to be a citizen in a democracy, one must participate
within its political activities equally with all other citizens.29
This inclusive vision of American democracy and the political
process is belied by the fact that many citizens in this country do not
participate in the electoral process. Voting in the American system is a
voluntary act. Thus, voting participation in the United States is not af-
fected by any direct official governmental interest3° in encouraging orrequiring voters to participate. 3' American citizens are free and able to
26. This was not the circumstance during the first one hundred fifty years of the republic.
Indeed, the Court in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874) stated that there was
no federal right to vote; the right to vote depended upon the regulation of the states; see also United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875) ("In Minor v. Happersett, we decided that the Consti-
tution of the United States has not conferred the right of suffrage upon any one, and that the United
States have no voters of their own creation in the States." (citation omitted)).
27. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964) ("No right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is under-
mined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily
abridges this right.").
28. See ELY, supra note 14, at 117 (noting that a right to vote is central to a right of participa-
tion in the democratic process).
29. Malinda L. Seymore, The Presidency and the Meaning of Citizenship, 2005 BYU L. REV.
927, 965 (2005) (describing political participation as a key theory upon which the concept of citize-
nry is grounded and noting that "[p]olitical participation would encompass at the very least the right
and obligation to vote and the right and obligation to serve in political office").
30. This is separate and apart, however, from the interests of those who perform the governing
and are subject to elections. Those persons clearly have an incentive to induce citizens disposed to
voting for them to do so. Conversely, such politicians also have an incentive to discourage voters
who are not inclined to vote for them from participating. Herein is one of the core problems of
allowing partisan politics to set the rules for participation in democratic governance. See Schacter,
supra note 22, at 473 (citing ELY, supra note 14, at 105-34) (explaining the inherent conflict of
interest in allowing incumbent elected officials to control a system that benefits them despite wheth-
er or not that system conforms to constitutionally grounded democratic principles).
31. This is in contrast to the mechanisms in other industrialized democracies. A number of
countries require that their voters participate in national elections through a number of direct and
indirect methods. In some countries, voting is legally mandated. In others, elections are held in
ways that are far easier for voters to access in comparison to the American system. For example,
voting may take place over a week-long period, or on a weekend, or on an official holiday. Addi-
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participate in the democratic process as they wish, with full freedom to
express-or not express-their preferences for the people who govern in
their name. 32 Despite the fundamental thesis of representative democra-
cy and the resulting interest one would expect from all citizens in voting,
American voter participation continues to decrease. 33  Though bias-
driven election barriers such as poll taxes, literacy tests, the all-white
primary, and other forms of voter exclusion have been eliminated from
various states' laws, voter participation in the United States continues to
diminish.34 It has been well documented that the percentage of participa-
tion in American elections has dropped dramatically over the last forty
years.35
This issue has been addressed in various contexts. Political scien-
tists have hypothesized about why so few Americans vote, and discussed
in detail whether there is a specific class gap in voter participation.36
tionally, in many systems, the government issues to all citizens voter identification (or some other
sort of national identification card) without requiring the citizen to make the effort to obtain such
identification. See Andrew C. Geddis, It's a Game Anyone Can Play: Election Laws Around the
World, 4 ELECT L. J. 57, 58 (2005) (reviewing Louis MASSiCOTrE, ANDRP BLAIS, & ANTOINE
YOSHINAKA, ESTABLISHING THE RULES OF THE GAME: ELECTION LAWS IN DEMOCRACIES (2004)).
32. Because participation in the democratic process is egalitarian in this sense, participation in
the process becomes an indicator of whether people are invested in the democratic process. Low
participation rates seem to reflect some degree of apathy concerning the typical American voter on
this score. Yet, the questions that the political participation scholars ask appear to go further than
merely inquiring about whether Americans do or do not care about the political process. The dra-
matically increased participation rates in the 2008 primary and general elections for President seem
to reflect interest, as opposed to apathy, in the political process. This appears generated by the fact
that Americans appear to see a greater stake in the question of who will lead their country at this
particular point in history. Given this heightened level of interest, the question of what other fac-
tors-particularly express and de facto legal factors-dissuade and isolate potential voters from
voting.
33. According to the Federal Election Commission, 56.70% of the voting age population
participated in the 2004 presidential election. FED. ELECTION COMM'N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2004:
ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 5 (2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalelections
2004.pdf.
34. Michael McDonald, 5 Myths About Turning out the Vote, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2006, at
B03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comwp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/27/AR200610
2701474.html (discussing how voter turnout in 1972, when eighteen-year-olds were given the right
to vote was 55.2%; this percentage declined to a low point of 48.9% in 1996).
35. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Forward: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics,
118 HARV. L. REv. 28, 37, n.46 (2004) (citing THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER:
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 3-23 (2002)). Pildes notes that studies like
Patterson's have substantiated the claim that voter turnout has significantly decreased in American
elections between 1960 and 2000. This claim, however, has been a subject of recent debate among
political science scholars. See also Michael P. McDonald & Samuel L. Popkin, The Myth of the
Vanishing Voter, 95:4 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 963, 963 (2001) ("[A]lthough the turnout rate outside the
South is lower than in the 1950s and early 1960s, there has been no downward trend during the last
30 years.").
36. For example, a number of political scientists have argued that voter turnout has fallen over
time and that such fallout has been concentrated among the poor. See RuY A. TEIXEIRA, THE
DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 59 (1992) (noting the popularity of the theory that a class gap
exists in voting and that this class gap results in the poor being left out of political discourse); see
also WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, The Appearance and Disappearance of the American Voter, in THE
CURRENT CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 121, 123-25 (1982); THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL, THE NEW
POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 180-83 (1984); FRANCES Fox PPVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY
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Though the ultimate ramifications of this research are debatable, the stu-
dies are premised on a model of political participation which stresses the
socioeconomic status of the participant and the fact that the participant
must make a rational cost/benefit analysis of whether to participate with-
in the electoral process. 37  Such a model will be helpful in shaping the
way we think about the effects of voter identification laws. It will allow
us to articulate how such laws impose a cost on voting, both direct and
indirect, on the voter. Such analysis will allow us to articulate a means
to adequately analyze and promote solutions to the problems posed by
such laws.
B. The Costs and Benefits of Voting
Political scientists have, through their research, worked to develop
various models to describe American voting behavior. The model most
applicable to the question of economic impact of voting rules on voters is
the rational actor model of voting behavior. The first premise of this
model is that voting exacts a cost on the voter.38 This cost is often ex-
acted is an economic cost.39  Additionally, there are a number of other
costs which should be taken into account. For example, the psychologi-
cal costs of voting can deter a voter. Voting in an election requires a
level of interest and attention that will divert the voter from other activi-
ties to which the voter may wish to attend.4° Thus, a voter must delibe-
rately think about the choices between political participation and other
activities in his or her life. Put another way, choosing to vote requires a
voter to forego other activities which may provide that person a benefit.4'
For example, if the voter wishes to participate, the voter will then need to
educate him or her self on the candidates, issues, and other pertinent in-
formation related to the voting process.
AMERICANS DON'T VOTE 15-16 (1980). However, other political scientists have questioned the
notion of a class gap based on empirical study. See, e.g., TEIXEIRA, supra at 69-71 (disputing the
existence of a class gap and attributing a decline to the view that participation generally is decreasing
across socioeconomic groups).
37. See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 16, at 10-13 ("[C]itizens of higher social and
economic status participate more in politics."). As such, socioeconomic status, whether it is meas-
ured in terms of level of education, income, or occupation, is an important variable in calculating the
benefits and costs of voting. But see DANIEL HAYES LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION
LAW 51-52 (2d ed. 2001) (summarizing the debates over whether socioeconomic status or the lack
of addressing the issues related to individuals of lower socioeconomic status is the source for low
American voter participation).
38. See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 16, at 8 (asserting that "[tihe likelihood that
an individual will vote is a direct expression of ... the costs associated with doing so"; the lower the
costs, the more likely it is that an individual will vote).
39. See id. (discussing registering to vote and traveling to the polls as examples of economic
costs associated with voting).
40. See id (discussing how costs such as learning about the candidates and deciding how to
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Second, voting requires the voter to meet the requirements for regis-
tration as set forth by state law prior to actually voting.42 A voter must
register before the election takes place, sometimes a month or more in
advance of an upcoming election, and then appear to vote on Election
Day (or cast an absentee ballot).43 As we will see below, the structural
cost of voting can be direct, as in the case of the poll tax, or indirect, as
in the case of voter identification laws and registration requirements gen-
erally. Further, in both instances, the fact that a cost is exacted creates a
disincentive for voters to cast their votes.
Third, intertwined with this structural or legal requirement is an
economic cost. On some level, even if the cost is relatively de minimis,
the voter has to make some kind of economic sacrifice to participate in
elections. Registering inherently requires voters to take time from eco-
nomically productive activities to participate, thus losing potential in-
come from that activity. Indeed, registration itself can be a cumbersome
process requiring a significant amount of time lost due to the fact that
registration offices are only open during business hours, registration of-
tentimes requires documentation, such as a birth certificate or a proof of
citizenship, and obtaining such documentation may require a great deal
of cost and effort to obtain. Measures such as the Help America Vote
Act (HAVA) and the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA)
have helped to shift this cost. For example, the NVRA required that
states provide means for voters to register while applying for or renewing
their drivers' licenses.44 This may shift the cost of voting to another ac-
tivity, filing with the DMV, but nonetheless it does require an economic
cost of the voter.
Voters must, in effect, undertake a cost/benefit analysis to deter-
mine whether they will participate in the political process. For example,
because of the nature of registration requirements, a potential voter may
be forced to choose between time spent at work, and registering to vote.45
According to the rational actor theory of voting, which captures this kind
of analysis, a voter must weigh the costs of voting and compare those
costs with the benefits gained from voting.46 If the cost outweighs the
benefit, then the potential voter will not participate in the voting
process.47 However, if the voter believes that he or she will benefit from
42. For a list of voter registration requirements state-by-state, see State Voter Information
Pages-U.S. Election Assistance Commission, http://www.eac.gov/voter/states (last visited Mar. 7,
2009).
43. See, e.g., Alaska - U.S. Election Assistance Commission, http://www.eac.gov/voter/states
(follow "Alaska" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
44. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973gg-2 (West 2009).
45. See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 16, at 8.
46. See Ellen Dinsmore, One Person, No Vote: Socioeconomic Bias in American Civic En-
gagement 53-54 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Wesleyan University) (citing SYDNEY VERBA
& NORMAN H. NE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY
(1972)).
47. See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 16, at 8-10.
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the act of voting, and that those benefits will outweigh the costs, then the
voter will engage in the act of voting.48
Thus, several factors emerge to illustrate the cost of voting: the po-
tential voter's interest in participating in the process, the potential voter's
willingness to become sufficiently educated in the issues and the candi-
dates to be willing to vote, and the potential voter's ability and willing-
ness to comply with the legal requirements related to voting-registering
and participating on election day.49
C. Direct and Indirect Costs of Voting
The analysis that follows will focus mainly on this third factor, the
willingness and ability for potential voters to comply with the legal re-
quirements related to voting. Usually, these requirements mandate that
the voter establish his or her registration with the state and then require
the voter to prove his or her identity at the time she wishes to vote. This
serves two purposes: to confirm the voter's identity and to ensure the
voter is actually registered to vote.50 In particular, modem voter identifi-
cation laws-specifically, those voter identification laws that require the
presentation of a government-issued photographic identification card-
focus most clearly on this proof-of-identity requirement. The key issue
for these laws is what forms of information the voter must gather to
prove his or her identity when registering and when appearing to vote.
Within the context of the legal barriers to the vote, several costs
present themselves. First, the registration requirements exact a particular
cost. Whether it is payment of a tax or gathering of registration mate-
rials, the effort to present appropriate credentials for voting exacts a bur-
den on the voter to participate in the voting process. These considera-
tions on voting can be considered as two types of costs-direct and indi-
rect. Direct costs for voting are those payments made directly to the
government in exchange for the ability to vote. In other words, direct
costs relate to the express ability to access a ballot from a governing au-
48. See id.
49. Id. at 8. But see LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 37, at 48-49 (noting the limitations of
rational choice theory and noting that voter turnout may very well not be caused by the costliness of
voting in time and effort). Notwithstanding this criticism of the rational voter/voter costliness
theory, this paper argues that this theory provides and adequate lens for understanding the effects of
photo ID voter identification laws precisely because these laws raise the price of voting to a level
where some voters will likely be priced out of the voting process. Thus, the effects of the likely cost
should be considered, based upon empirical evidence, when evaluating these laws. See generally
OVERTON, supra note 18, at 161-62 (suggesting that judges also need to rely on empirical data rather
than just anecdotes and analogies when determining the constitutionality of photo identification
laws).
50. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTER
IDENTIFICATION (2008), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/elect/taskfc/VoterlD
Req.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2009) (providing information and tables outlining photo ID require-
ments in each state); State Voter Information Pages-U.S. Election Assistance Commission,
http://www.eac.gov/voter/states/voter-information-by-state (last visited Mar. 7, 2009) (listing voter
registration requirements state-by-state).
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thority. Such costs would involve the exchange of money between the
potential voter and the government authority that is running the election
itself, e.g., the payment of a poll tax, the requirement to purchase an
identification card, and other such costs.
Indirect costs are the costs a voter has to expend to become eligible
to vote, but the costs are not paid directly to the government or otherwise
related to the actual casting of a ballot. Those costs include the cost re-
lated to a person identifying him or herself, whether through obtaining a
government-issued photographic identification card such as a driver's
license, passport, employment card, or some other related type of card;
proving one's citizenship; proving one's current address; proving one's
location of birth; or other requirements that relate to this proof.5' Often
such proof requires a potential voter to travel to the issuing office, obtain
documents which form the basis of being issued a governmental photo
ID, or other costs associated with obtaining an ID.
The indirect costs of voting are inherent in the act of voting. Unlike
other protected rights, the act of voting is voluntary and requires the vot-
er to make an affirmative effort to participate in the electoral process.
Thus, the nature and complexity of the indirect costs to voting can create
disincentives for voting. Political science research suggests that such
costs, as represented by registration requirements and photo identifica-
tion requirements, in and of themselves form a barrier to political partici-
pation for those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged. 53 The com-
plexity of the legal rules surrounding voting simply creates a disincentive
for participation. Because the costs are so high to some, the disincentive
cannot be overcome simply by transforming one kind of indirect cost of
voting into another indirect CoSt. 54  The cost still remains, and for the
51. See, e.g., U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL MAIL VOTER
REGISTRATION FORM (2006), available at http://www.eac.gov/files/voter/nvraupdate.pdf (last
visited Mar. 7, 2009).
52. See, e.g., Darryl Fears, Voter ID Law is Overturned, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005, at A03,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/27/AR2005102702
171 html (discussing hardships that voters in Georgia faced when attempting to register); Ian Urbina,
Voter ID Laws are Set to Face a Crucial Test, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008, at A01, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/07/us/O7identity.html?pagewanted=1 &r=- 1 (discussing an elderly
woman's hardship in getting to the voting office to prove her identity in time to vote); Joan Biskupic,
Indiana Voter ID Case may Hinge on the Theoretical; Supreme Court Takes up Dispute in Which
Both Sides are Lacking Proof of Actual Harm, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 2008, at 4A, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-01-06-court_- N.htm (identifying those who could
be hurt by voter registration laws; among them, a stroke victim who made one trip to a state office
for an alternative ID but did not have the proper document, and so returned home on foot with the
aid of his walker, and a mother of seven who found it would cost $26-$50 to round up the necessary
papers for a proper ID).
53. See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 16, at 8.
54. In other words, the cost of appropriate photo identification cannot be eliminated simply
because the cost of purchasing the photo identification from the government is minimized. In a
situation where a fee for a photo ID is not assessed, the cost of the fee is removed but the other
attended costs-gathering identification, losing time from other economically productive activity,
and so on--cannot be replaced. See OVERTON, supra note 18, at 153-54 (discussing the financial
burden associated with obtaining photo identification). For example, a certified copy of a birth
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voter who does not think that there is a benefit to participating and who
is, moreover, overwhelmed by the nature of the cost exacted, that person
will be effectively excluded from the electorate because that person will
choose not to vote.55 This effect is sometimes called "structural disen-
franchisement., 56 Structural disenfranchisement has been defined as a
complex interaction between the direct and indirect costs exacted upon
voters for participation in the electoral system.5 7 The courts have been
relatively vague and ad hoc in analyzing such indirect costs.
Political elites have used the costs of voting in a variety of ways to
create disincentives to vote during all periods of American history. Such
categories as property ownership, residency, and ability to pay poll taxes
have all been used as tools to exclude certain categories of otherwise
eligible voters from the polls. 58 The argument for use of such indicators
was one of proper stake of ownership within the society. 59 Historically,
this has been a shibboleth for marking a certain class or group of voters
as undesirable and a lower type of participant in society. The kinds of
social controls exacted by levying certain types of costs--direct and indi-
rect-have been one of the means of identifying and excluding citizens
otherwise entitled to vote. This article will turn next to a discussion of
these costs as they have existed throughout the history of the American
electorate.
II. A PAY-TO-PLAY SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE COST OF THE VOTE
The use of economic restraints to effectively increase the cost of
voting to the voter is nothing new. Indeed, the use of an indicator of
socioeconomic status as a requirement to vote has been a requirement for
voting in the American system since the beginning of the American re-
public.6° Unlike the ideal of American democracy-the view that all
citizens can participate in the electoral process-the American electorate
at its beginning was based on the notion that the voter must be able to
demonstrate an economic stake in the society in order to participate in
the political process.61 The nature of the requirement has shifted from
certificate could cost anywhere between $10 and $45, a passport costs $85 to obtain, and limited
business hours and long lines at DMV offices discourage some from taking time out of their day to
obtain photo identification in order to vote. Id. It is these costs that prevent some voters, particular-
ly voters who cannot afford to lose time from work or obtain necessary transportation, from obtain-
ing an otherwise "free" identification card.
55. See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 16, at 8 (suggesting that individuals who
most easily absorb costs associated with voting will find more of a benefit in voting than those with
minimal resources).
56. See DONZIGER, supra note 19, at 1.
57. Id.
58. See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 9-10, 28-30, 35-37, 61-62 (discussing laws that were put
into place to disenfranchise poor and minority voters).
59. Id. at 8-10.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 9, 29 (suggesting that after the Revolution, the general attitude was that "only men
with property... were deemed to be sufficiently attached to the community and sufficiently affected
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one of requiring property to requiring the payment of a tax to possessing
the means to identify oneself within the context of being a member of the
voting community. Indeed, in some states in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, both the property ownership requirement and the taxation
requirement were necessary to vote.62 Voters were required to demon-
strate some minimum economic status they possessed before they could
be allowed to vote. This part of the article will discuss the history of this
socioeconomic requirement for the right to vote and the tension between
the democratic aspiration and the truth of the economic barrier to the
franchise.
A. The Franchise in the Early Republic
At the beginning of the American republic there were few centra-
lized rules governing who would be admitted to the franchise. Each of
the thirteen original colonies had its own laws to determine voter eligibil-
ity in state elections. These requirements often centered on the voter
demonstrating that he owned some amount of property within the locality
in which the voter sought to vote. To the extent the original United
States Constitution speaks to voting, it did not create a specific voting
right or voting requirement. Indeed, the Constitution declined to take a
stance as to which people would affirmatively be allowed to vote.63 The
only references to the right to vote and who would determine the scope
of that right are inferential. For example, the Constitution specifies that
"the People of the several States" shall choose their representatives for
the House of Representatives 64 and the legislators of the state legislatures
shall choose the members of the United States Senate.65 The Constitu-
tion also set out the Electoral College for the election of the President
and the Vice President of the United States.66 In both of these instances,
the Constitution leaves it to the states to determine who the electorate
by its laws to have earned the privilege of voting," and that "the interests of the propertyless...
could be represented effectively by wise, fair-minded, wealthy white men").
62. See id. at 29 (discussing how even after the widespread abolishment of property require-
ments, many states enacted taxpaying requirements that preserved "the link between a person's
financial status and his right to vote").
63. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1964) (providing a detailed discussion of the
framers' considerations about whether and how the right to vote to elect representatives should be
framed in the Constitution).
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (amended 1913). This requirement was changed to allow for
the popular election of Senators with the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XVIL § 1. However, while the amendment notes that the election of the Senators
will be done by the "people," it does not set up any requirements as to who the people will be. See
id.
66. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The amendment in 1804
retained the structure that the electors shall cast ballots for the office of president rather than the
people directly. The assumption is that the electors shall vote for the person who won the popular
vote, though that assumption is not expressly stated within the Constitution.
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will be to choose their federal representatives and the state legislators
who will choose the United States Senate.67
The Constitution of 1787 left the states free to determine the popu-
lation that would be the voting electorate. The states proceeded to de-
fine-or merely continued to use already existing-schemes to deter-
mine who would be counted within the electorate. The scheme most
frequently used within the early republic was the property ownership
requirement. Under the property requirement, one had to be a real land
owner, or possess at least $300 to $500 in personal property.68 The
rationale for the property requirement in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries was that "[o]nly men with property . . were deemed to be
sufficiently attached to the community and sufficiently affected by its
laws to have earned the privilege of voting. 69 Underlying this view
was the belief that "[t]he interests of the propertyless ...could be
represented effectively by wise, fair-minded, wealthy white men. 7°
Further, this barrier served to maintain order in society. The view was
if the propertyless were allowed to have the vote, they would prove to
be "a menace to the maintenance of a well-ordered community. 71
As the American republic grew and changed economically, qualifi-
cations based on property and literacy proved ineffective to maintain the
social order and exclude desirable voters from undesirable voters, partic-
ularly in the antebellum South. In other words, the wealth qualifications
had the effect of excluding white male voters who had an otherwise suf-
ficient "stake" to participate in elections, even though they did not meet
67. These provisions of the Constitution suggest that states were left to develop and structure
laws to access the vote. In contrast, the one area where the Constitution upheld a state practice of
voter exclusion was to exclude slaves from the electoral process. It does so by proscribing whom the
population will be for purposes of apportioning representation and taxation. The Constitution pre-
scribes the use of a decennial census to tabulate the population of the United States. U.S. CONST.
Art I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 2. Article I then directs that representation
will be based on the tabulation of the whole number of free persons, persons in servitude for a num-
ber of years, and three-fifths of "all other Persons." Id. The "three-fifths compromise" was meant to
strike a balance between the population of slave states, whose economy and population were based
upon slavery, and the free states, which had greater economic wealth but lower population. This
implicitly suggested that the voting populace (as well as the democratic citizenry for all intents and
purposes) only consisted of "free" persons; all others would simply serve to bolster the population
count and no other purpose. Thus, the Constitution suggested what was in practice at the time in the
individual states-that slavery was accepted and political representation depended on those persons
who were free, and the power that those free persons held over those bound up in slavery.
Indeed, the Constitution itself, which, as argued above, implicitly sanctioned a political
participation system based upon property ownership, allowed for the ability to practice the franchise
upon the ability of one person to own another and to allow the ownership of slaves to count as
"property" for purposes of voting. This quandary of a greater and a lesser class of people separated
by the subordination inherent in one group of people being the property of another group lies at the
heart of the American political dilemma concerning race and politics. I intend to explore this is-
sue-and it's intertwined relationship between personhood, political power, and property-in a
future article.
68. See WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 331.
69. KEYSsAR, supra note 8, at 9.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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the property qualifications. In some Southern states, the median yearly
income did not equal the property qualification. Historian C. Vann
Woodward points out that "[o]f the 231 counties in the United States in
which 20 per cent or more of the whites of voting age were illiterate,
204 were in the South., 72 It was in these counties where poverty was
rampant and literacy rates low, white voters were largely excluded from
the polls. This became an untenable situation in a largely agrarian socie-
ty where white men were increasingly accumulating wealth, even though
it was not in terms of real property, and demanding the vote. Because of
factors like this, an absolute bar based on property was unworkable.
Moreover, the property requirement in and of itself had the effect of
disenfranchising many otherwise voting-eligible white men. Indeed,
in North Carolina for example, the property requirements disenfran-
chised fifty thousand free white men.73 These voters frequently de-
manded their vote and this social pressure eventually caused the prop-
erty requirements to be eased.74
B. The Reconstruction Amendments and Defining the Right to Vote
As noted above, the right to vote was not defined directly in the
United States Constitution. The states had the power to set the rules as to
how one could qualify to vote and to grant access to the polls on Election
Day. The states emphasized property requirements in order to ensure
that the voter had an economic connection to the community. However,
as a result of the Civil War and the passage of the Reconstruction
Amendments to the Constitution, the right to vote was strongly implied
to exist and would be protected under the national Constitution. This
ideal was fixed into our constitutional scope; yet the amendments did not
change the fundamental relationship between the voter and the ability to
vote-an economic stake in the community.
The passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
Constitution represented an assertion of national power over the authori-
ty states had to control voting. This assertion of power was, by its na-
ture, limited. The Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed that "[n]o state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States; . . . nor deny to any
72. WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 331-32. Another type of text that was instituted in the
nineteenth century was the literacy test. In several states where the property requirement had
evolved into a test of whether one simply owned real property in the jurisdiction, the literacy test
was added. It simply required that the potential voter had to be literate enough to read in order to
vote, though the judgment of "literate enough" was often in the hands of the registrar of voters. See
KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 112. Since one had to have sufficient wealth to obtain education during
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, literacy requirements also proved to be a wealth-based
form of discrimination.
73. See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 41.
74. The property restriction on voting began to diminish after 1790. However, Massachusetts
and New York did not abolish their property requirements until 1821, Virginia not until 1850 and
North Carolina not until the mid-1850s. Id. at 29.
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person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 75 The
Fifteenth Amendment ordered that the right of citizens "to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on ac-
count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude., 76 Thus, under
federal law, voters were guaranteed not to be discriminated against on
the basis of race when it came to voting. Yet, these rules merely prohi-
bited express racial discrimination commands and did not guarantee the
right to vote to all citizens.77 As a result, states were nonetheless free
to create socioeconomic and other barriers to the full and free exercise
of the franchise.
This is not to diminish the fact that the enforcement of the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments by Union troops during Reconstruc-
tion provided the opportunity for former slaves to have an active and
tremendous impact on American electoral politics. African Americans
elected a number of representatives in many of the states of the former
Confederacy. African Americans sent representatives to Congress and
elected senior officials in state and local governments across the South.
African Americans made tremendous progress throughout the South be-
tween 1870 and 1890. Yet, this progress was thwarted through a series
of political, legislative, and judicial decisions. Federal forces were with-
drawn from the South by President Rutherford B. Hayes in 1877. The
ex-Confederate states, without federal supervision, were able to reclaim
control of their state legislatures through the Democratic Party and insti-
tute plans to disenfranchise African Americans. Thus, neither the words
of the U.S. Constitution nor the courts would stand in the way of the
turn-of-the-century state constitutional revision conventions and their
agenda of disenfranchisement.78 Rather than a barrier to the polls
based on race, the mechanism the States would use to disenfranchise
would be based on economic status.
79
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
76. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV. The Nineteenth Amendment, which came into effect in 1920,
some fifty years after the Reconstruction amendments, made the same guarantee on the basis of sex.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
77. In essence, as long as the rules the states adopted did not explicitly differentiate the ability
to vote on the basis of race-that is, as long as those rules were neutral towards race--there was no
constitutional violation of the Constitution concerning the franchise. Consequently, such neutrality
merely enshrined the status quo of African American subordination through focusing ultimately on
the effects of creating a wealth requirement for voting, i.e., a poll tax. Cf. Beverly Moran & Stepha-
nie M. Wildman, Race and Wealth Disparity: The Role of Law and the Legal System, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1219, 1221 (2007) (noting how neutrality and equality can support subordination and
hierarchy through protecting property rights and status inequalities inherent in the economic system).
The risk is that the same effect may be present here in photo identification laws.
78. KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 110-16 (discussing states that adopted laws disenfranchising
blacks in the face of the reconstruction amendments); see Michael J. Klarman, The Supreme Court
and Black Disenfranchisement, in THE VOTING RIGHTS Amr: SECURING THE BALLOT 38-46 (Richard
M. Valelly ed., 2006).
79. Cf. Parson & McLaughlin, supra note 20, at 78 ("In an even larger effort to prohibit
African Americans from casting their vote, state officials would again enact race-neutral voting
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C. The Jim Crow Poll Tax of the Twentieth Century
By the turn of the twentieth century, the ex-Confederate states from
Mississippi to Virginia revised their constitutions to include economic
and educational requirements specifically designed to prevent African
Americans from possessing the right to vote. 80 These prerequisites to the
franchise included meeting particular standards of ownership of property,
passing literacy tests, and the payment of a poll tax. 81 Though the in-
tent of these state constitutional provisions was plainly discriminatory,
these tests did not explicitly discriminate against any group, such as
African Americans, and the laws were ultimately considered neutral
and fair by the courts. 82 However, these neutral rules created a different
problem-they disenfranchised poor whites as well as poor blacks. To
address this concern, the state constitutional conventions created a series
of loopholes to guarantee poor white voting while discouraging the
African American exercise of the franchise.83 It was this economic
requirement which endured and which this paper will now examine in
detail.
The ex-Confederate legislatures turned specifically to the poll tax to
remove those voters-largely African Americans-whom they sought to
exclude from the electorate. The poll tax did not discriminate against
African Americans directly, but set up an economic status requirement
that, while neutral on its face, had the effect of disenfranchising many.
The discrimination was effective, however, because poll tax re-
quirements were simply quite expensive. Poll tax payments ranged from
$1.00 to $2.00 per year, which was an extreme amount to many.84 This
qualifications with pretextual technicalities invented on the spot to eliminate African Americans
from the registration process.").
80. KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 111-13.
81. Id. at 111-12, 351-58 tbls.A.9, A.10 & A.11, 362-67 tbl.A.13; see also Klarman, supra
note 78, at 37-38.
82. KEYssAR, supra note 8, at 111 (discussing ways in which "Democrats chose to solidify
their hold on the South by modifying the voting laws in ways that would exclude African Americans
without overtly violating the Fifteenth Amendment.").
83. These voting "qualifications" are legendary and worth brief mention here. The first of
these qualifications, the "understanding clause," was implemented by the Mississippi constitutional
convention. It permitted poll registrars to register voters who could "understand" any section of the
state constitution read to them. KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 111. However, this method of enfran-
chisement was widely criticized as merely a means to perpetrate mass fraud in order to fill the elec-
torate with voters the planter elite sanctioned. In reaction, southern states turned to the "grandfather
clause." "This [rule] exempted from the literacy and property tests those ... [who were able] to vote
... [, along with their sons and grandsons, as of] January 1, 1867." WOODWARD, supra note 7, at
334. It should come as no surprise that most of these exempted voters were white. See also
KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 112. Such provisions were also labeled and fought as "un-American,"
"undemocratic," and outright fraud. See WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 334. These special clauses
were of limited duration in some states---that is, they only carried validity for a limited amount of
time and then would be phased out. However, the poll tax-the requirement that a potential voter
had to pay a levy before being granted access to the franchise--endured in the south for eighty years
as a fixture in southern turn-of-the-century Jim Crow constitutions.
84. OGDEN, supra note 7, at 32-33 tbl. 1; see also KEYSSAR, supra note 8, 356-57 tbl.A. 10.
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expense was compounded by the set of complex procedures set up to
affect and prove poll tax payments. First, the payment of the poll tax
was optional. Usually, no tax assessor would solicit payment of the poll
tax along with the payment of other taxes. Even if a solicitor did require
poll tax payment, that person would not necessarily explain to the tax-
payer that the poll tax payment was a prerequisite to voting. Second,
poll taxes accumulated. A potential voter had to have paid his or her poll
taxes for a period of one to three years prior to the period when he de-
sired to vote before being allowed to proceed to the registrar. Third,
these cumulative payments had to be paid in full well in advance of the
elections for which it was required (sometimes, as far in advance as eigh-
teen months). 85  As Woodward put it, "[g]reat effectiveness was ex-
pected of this feature in the case of the 'vicious voter' of both races."
Quoting an Alabama disenfranchiser, Woodward pointed to the heart
of the matter: "[w]e want that poll tax to pile up so high that he [the
"vicious voter"] will never be able to vote again." 86 Fourth, when the
poll tax was paid, the tax receipt had to be preserved and presented to
both the registrar of voters at registration and the official at the poll on
Election Day.
87
The penalty for not following this complicated structure was disen-
franchisement. Professor Woodward states: "[slince the payment of
the poll tax was optional, complicated, and burdensome, and since
additional tests and hurdles might still deprive prospective voters of
their ballots even if they paid the tax, it is little wonder that thousands
lost the suffrage. 88
Indeed, thousands of African Americans lost suffrage. In Alabama,
the eligible Black voting population had fallen to less than two percent.
In Virginia, the tax was implemented in 1903. By 1910, Black registra-
tion had sunk from its high participation rate to a paltry fifteen percent.
In contrast, the white voting rolls in Virginia maintained nearly eighty
85. OGDEN, supra note 7, at 46; see also id. at 32-33 (providing an overview of how poll tax
payments operated).
86. WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 336.
87. For further details concerning the form of and the collection of the poll tax, see OGDEN,
supra note 7, at 32-76.
88. WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 335. For example, the Virginia poll tax of 1966 required a
fee of $1.50, payable six months before the election in which the voter wished to participate. Given
the fact that different elections took place at different times of the year, different deadlines existed.
For instance, if the-voter wished to vote for the Mayor of Richmond, she was required to pay her
poll tax by early January of the year of the election. However, if one wished to vote only for gover-
nor of the state, she had to register by early May, six months before the November election. See
Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 9-10, Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (No. 48), reprinted in 62 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTrrTUIONAL LAW 992 (Phillip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975)
[hereinafter BRIEFS].
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percent of the voters of age.89 This virtually all-white electorate contin-
ued to exist for nearly fifty years.
The legal genesis of this mass African American disenfranchise-
ment was the constitutional conventions across the South. These con-
ventions began with Mississippi in 1880. The last convention, held in
Virginia, was from 1901 to 1902. The purpose was quite simple: to dis-
enfranchise the African American voter. The framers at these conven-
tions justified this stance on their view that African Americans, who had
just emerged from slavery, had little education or knowledge of how to
participate in citizenship. Thus, to make African Americans equally
responsible citizens in the electorate would do injustice to both the Ne-
gro and the white man. Some delegates saw this as a problem of "en-
forced equality between unequal races." What they sought to avoid
was another period of history, like Reconstruction, where "the Anglo-
Saxon will again submit to the domination of the black man." 90
The problem the conventions faced was how to solve the problem
of an African American electorate without violating the Fifteenth
Amendment. The solution was to implement the "Mississippi Plan" to
establish a number of suffrage requirements that would have the effect
of disenfranchising African Americans. The Supreme Court upheld
the Mississippi Plan and its basis, the legality of the poll tax, in Wil-
liams v. Mississippi.91 At the heart of the plan was the fact that the suf-
frage regulations had no direct animus against minorities and were
based on the notion of "fair administration" of elections. Thus, they
passed constitutional muster.
The poll tax endured as a prerequisite to the franchise (and thus a
substantial barrier to the franchise for the poor, especially poor African
Americans) until it was struck down in the mid 1960s. For that amount
of time, however, the tax endured in Virginia (as well as in Alabama,
89. DONALD G. NIEMAN, AFRICAN AMERICAN LIFE IN THE POST-EMANCIPATION SOUTH,
1861-1900, 6 AFRICAN AMERICANS AND SOUTHERN POLITICS FROM REDEMPTION TO
DISENFRANCHISEMENT, at xi (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1994).
90. Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, RICHMOND DISPATCH (Va.), Apr. 3, 1902,
at 10. It almost goes without saying that this view of the legislators in turn-of-the-century Virginia,
as well as all across the ex-Confederate south, was premised on the social inequalities created during
slavery. See supra note 67.
91. 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898). Williams involved an African American convict who appealed
his sentence on the grounds that the jury who convicted him was composed in a manner that was
unconstitutional. The appellant complained that the composition of juries in Mississippi was based
upon a statute which required that all jury participants pay poll taxes to the state prior to being al-
lowed to vote (or to serve on a jury). Because Mississippi juries then were all white, he complained
that the statute as applied was unconstitutional. The Court rejected these challenges on the grounds
that the statute did not discriminate on the basis of race and therefore did not violate the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court went further to reject the contention that the
disparate impact the statute had was a grounds for declaring the statute unconstitutional. See id.
("They [the Mississippi poll tax statutes] do not on their face discriminate between the races, and it
has not been shown that their actual administration was evil, only that evil was possible under
them.").
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Mississippi and Texas) where in others states, including Louisiana,
Georgia, and North Carolina, the legislature or the people through refe-
renda removed the tax from state constitutions.92 The main purpose of
instituting these revisions was to disenfranchise undesirable voters-
particularly African American voters.93 These preparations, in their
meticulous detail, effectively disenfranchised the poor African American
voting populace by circumventing the intent of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Voting participation
by African American males declined from ninety-eight percent in 1885
to ten percent in 1905. 94
The poll tax served as a substantial class barrier to those who
wished to participate in elective politics. The southern disenfranchising
conventions set up a complex system for registering and made the ef-
fort burdensome for those who sought to comply. Yet, the discretion
remained in the hands of the registrar to examine the perspective voter.
This left open the possibility for fraud and manipulation of the voter
rolls. The end result was that for over sixty years, whites of all classes
could vote while poor Blacks could not.
D. The Courts and the Poll Tax in the Jim Crow Era
The intent of the turn of the twentieth century conventions was
clear: Southern legislatures sought to disenfranchise African Americans
through the use of economic measures-mainly, the poll tax. The consti-
tutionality of these measures was upheld in Williams v. Mississippi.
95
However, parties challenged the tax on various grounds.96  The Court
upheld the tax and maintained, in effect, that class-based requirements
were constitutional grounds on which to withhold the franchise.
97
92. See Klarman, supra note 78, at 45 (discussing how North Carolina, Florida and Louisiana
abolished poll tax on their own prior to the Breedlove decision). In addition to its enduring quality,
the poll tax and other disenfranchisement tools enshrined in 1901 Virginia Constitution exemplified
of the types of laws that developed to restrain the franchise. As discussed earlier, the elements of the
understanding clause, the grandfather clause, and the poll tax were added to the constitutions of
southern states during the wave of revision conventions which took place between 1890 and 1910.
See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 111-13.
93. KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 111-13.
94. KOUSSER, supra note 7, at 174. This was the clear intent of this plan: to disenfranchise
African American voters without violating the Reconstruction Amendments. For example, the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals went so far as to admit this: "[als we have seen, the principal
object of calling the convention of 1901 was to purge the electorate of undesirable and ignorant
voters, and the chief difficulty in accomplishing that object was found in the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments to the Constitution of the United States." See Willis v. Kalmbach, 64 S.E. 342, 348 (Va.
1909).
95. 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898).
96. Id. at 220-21.
97. Id. at 225.
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1. Breedlove v. Stuttles
The monolith of the poll tax was fought on many fronts, including
popular politics, the legislature, and the courtroom. However, the legal
battle against the poll tax failed during the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury. The major case of this era was Breedlove v. Suttles.98 The Su-
preme Court upheld the Georgia poll tax and affirmed its legality for the
next twenty-nine years. 99 Mr. Breedlove, a twenty-eight year old white
male, was denied the ability to register because he had not fulfilled the
poll tax prerequisite. He sued the state tax collector, claiming that the
denial of his right to vote because he did not pay his poll tax worked a
denial of his protected privilege and immunity to vote and his right to
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion.'0°
The Court held that making a poll tax payment did not deny him
any privilege and immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment.10 The
Court explained that the right to vote was not derived from the federal
Constitution but from the individual states.10 2 The only constraint on this
right existed in the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. Therefore,
"the state may condition suffrage as it deems appropriate."'0 3 The Court
reasoned further that "the payment of poll taxes as a prerequisite to vot-
ing is a familiar and reasonable regulation long enforced in many states
and for more than a century in Georgia. That measure reasonably may
be deemed essential to that form of levy."' 4 In other words, the Court
found that the state had a reasonable interest in collecting the tax, and
that making the tax a prerequisite to voting constituted a rational state
action. The court deferred to the judgment of the state. 05 Thus, the
1937 Supreme Court found that the poll tax was constitutional.' °6 Effec-
98. 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
99. Id. at 283-84.
100. Id. at 280.
101. Id. at 283.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 283-84.
105. The Breedlove decision did not consider the racial consequences of the poll tax--or, for
that matter, the tremendous effect of disenfranchisement on poor whites. Interestingly, the one
major distinction that the decision drew was concerning men and women in relation to the poll tax.
Georgia law had required that the male, as "head of the family," was responsible for payment of the
tax. In the face of the plaintiffs' argument that this rule treated men and women differently for no
rational reason, the court stated that this tax burdened all men equally, and thus was not a violation
of equal protection. Id. at 282. "Women may be exempted on the basis of special considerations to
which they are naturally entitled. In view of burdens necessarily borne by them for the preservation
of the race, the state reasonably may exempt them from poll taxes." Id.
106. The year after Breedlove, in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), the Supreme Court stated that "[t]here may be narrower scope for opera-
tion of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specif-
ic prohibition of the Constitution." This one sentence indicated that the Court will not easily defer to
legislative judgments concerning the validity of laws, especially if those laws affected the rights of
people as guaranteed within the Bill of Rights or within other protected contexts. The court offered
the "right to vote" as one of those arenas where the court would apply a stricter standard of review
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tively, the Supreme Court allowed the states to charge whatever cost the
legislatures deemed rational, and maintain its apathy towards this class-
based exclusion from the electorate.
2. Butler v. Thompson: Racial Discrimination and the Poll Tax
In what was to mark the beginning of civil rights litigation to come,
a plaintiff challenged the poll tax as a violation of equal protection. In
Butler v. Thompson,10 7 Jessie Butler, an African American female,
brought suit against the Central Registrar of Arlington County, Virgin-
ia. Butler claimed that the registrar refused to allow her to register to
vote because she had not paid her poll taxes for the ten years preceding
her registration.' °8 Butler argued that the poll tax requirement was un-
constitutional because the poll tax was enacted by the Virginia Constitu-
tional Convention of 1902 with the specific purpose of disenfranchising
the Negro. 109 Further, she alleged that the election officials of Virginia
had conspired to administer the law in such a way as to maintain the
disenfranchisement of the Negro.110 She contended that these laws vi-
olated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.'
The Butler court summarily ruled against Ms. Butler. It stated that
the intent of the statute was irrelevant. The court reasoned that while the
Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1902 did express a desire to dis-
enfranchise the Negro, the laws which resulted from the convention
were "valid under the Federal Constitution or Federal laws."'1 12 Further,
the court stated the administration of the law was fair. The court pointed
to statistics that stated that by 1950, sixty-one percent of the African
Americans in Virginia were assessed poll taxes as compared to approx-
imately seventy-six percent of the whites in Virginia. Given this dif-
ference of poll tax assessment rates, the court contended that the tax
was administered fairly.'13
than merely accepting any purpose a legislative body articulated. See id. ("[L]egislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesira-
ble legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation."). Though this statement was
merely dicta, this one recognition began the opening of the door for Harper and other cases that
sustained the right to vote for all without regard to class as well as other protected rights. See Jane S.
Schacter, Ely and the Idea Of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REv. 737, 739-41, 746-47 (2004) (noting that
Carolene Products represents implementation of the democratic ideal of horizontal democracy).
107. 97 F. Supp. 17, 18-19 (E.D. Va. 1951), affd, 341 U.S. 937 (1951).
108. Id. at 19, 24.
109. Id. at 20.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 19.
112. Id. at 21.
113. Id. at 23. The Butler court stated "Certainly we cannot declare the Virginia poll tax laws
invalid solely on these statistics upon the assumption that a difference of 15% in poll tax assessments
between Negroes and white persons .... I Id. This implies that the court had assumed some sort of
disparate impact standard and found the case failed to meet it here.
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Since the court found that the tax was fair and valid on its face and
as administered, the court upheld the poll tax by invoking what the court
called a settled rule of law: "Finally, in this connection, it is well settled
that a law that is fair on its face and is also fairly administered is not
rendered invalid by the evil motives of its draftsmen . . .[nor does]
such a law ...offend the Federal Constitution ... ,14 This was
true, according to the court, because "courts cannot inquire into the
motives of the legislators in passing them, except as they may be dis-
closed on the face of the acts, or [inferable] from their operation ....,115
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed.
In both Breedlove and Butler, the federal courts upheld the poll tax
on the basis that the decision as to what types of qualifications were ne-
cessary for the vote lies in the purview of state legislatures. The courts
reasoned that if the basis is rational and the law is neutral on its face
(notwithstanding the discriminatory intent of the law) and the law is en-
forced fairly, then it would meet constitutional muster. Accordingly, this
economic standard-the poll tax-would be considered constitutional.
E. The Abolition of the Poll Tax-Harper v. Virginia
Breedlove remained the law until 1966. By the early sixties, how-
ever, several events had taken place which inched the court to the reali-
zation that voting was a fundamental right and that the conditioning of
that right upon payment of a tax was unconstitutional. First, the nation
ratified the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964, which eliminated the
poll tax from all federal elections. Second, Congress passed the Voting
Rights Act in 1964 and the Civil Rights Act in 1965. This granted the
United States Justice Department broad power to initiate lawsuits to
protect African Americans from discrimination by the states, including
discrimination based on denial of the ability to vote.' 1 6 Finally, in this
context, the Civil Rights movement influenced policy makers who rati-
fied the two aforementioned rules of law, and shaped the national con-
ception of what should be considered as protected rights. 117
114. Id. at 21-22.
115. id. at 21.
116. The Voting Rights Act accorded the United States Justice Department significant powers
to enforce the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment to protect African Americans from discrimi-
nation in voting. These protections resulted in massive gains for the African American right to vote.
As Parson and McLaughlin point out, "the percentage of African Americans of voting age registered
to vote in the South, which was approximately three percent (3%) in 1940, increased from 43.3
percent ... in 1934 to approximately 63.7 percent." Parson & McLaughlin, supra note 20, at 86.
These numbers also illustrate the deep impact that the poll tax had-along with other discriminatory
devices-in infringing on the right to vote.
117. See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 257-68 (discussing the history of the Civil Rights Move-
ment and voting rights movements from the 1950s through the 1960s). McClain et al., in THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: SECURING THE BALLOT, supra note 8, at 70-72 (discussing Freedom Vote and
Freedom Summer campaigns, which led to voting rights reform legislation).
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In this new political and legal environment came the challenge to
the poll tax that proved effective. Several African American men and
women attempted to register and vote in the early sixties. All of these
plaintiffs were Black citizens of Virginia who met the age and residency
requirements to participate in state elections. However, because they
were unemployed or employed in less than profitable occupations, they
were unable to meet the poll tax requirement. 1 8 As a result, they were
denied the right to vote." 9 These plaintiffs sued the Virginia State
Board of Elections on the grounds that the poll tax abridged their privi-
leges and immunities as United States citizens as well as violated their
right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In an unsigned per curium opinion, a three judge panel of the Eastern
District of Virginia summarily dismissed the claim of the plaintiffs citing
Breedlove.120  The court noted that "[t]he tax is levied upon every adult
resident irrespective of his intent to vote. Moreover, no racial discrim-
ination is exhibited in its application as a condition to voting.' 21 Ms.
Harper and the other plaintiffs appealed this decision to the United
States Supreme Court. 
22
118. They included Anne E. Harper, a single woman who supported herself by performing
household work. At the time of her lawsuit, however, she was dependent on federal social security
benefits. She was required to pay $4.74 in order to meet her poll tax requirement, a requirement she
could not afford. Gladys A. Berry was also single. She had no source of income and cared for seven
minor children (two were hers and the other five belonged to her married daughters). Curtis Burr
worked in the construction industry. His gross income was less than $5,000. He had to care for his
wife, Myrtle, and their nine children. In order to participate in the elections, the two of them would
have to pay $10.02. BRIEFS, supra note 88, at 881-83.
119. KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 269-71.
120. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 240 F. Supp. 270, 271 (1964).
121. Id. Testimony was presented at trial as to the disparate economic and race-based effects
that the poll tax had on the poor. However, the court did not find that illegal racial purposes or
illegal application of the law played a role in the poll tax. Though the intent was clear to any skim of
the original constitutional convention record, the Supreme Court could ignore it because the district
court claimed that the administration of the tax in the 1960s did not rely explicitly on that original
intent.
122. The Supreme Court arguments for the Harper plaintiffs focused on the economic impact
of the tax on the poor. Harper's counsel argued that the state had intentionally designed the poll tax
"to limit the right of suffrage to those who took sufficient interest in the affairs of the State to qualify
themselves to vote." BRIEFS, supra note 87, at 1028. He argued that it is obvious that the poor will
be excluded from the franchise by definition. Further, "the tax does not in any way establish their
[the poor's] lack of responsibility as citizens, nor their lack of intelligence." Id. Solicitor General
Thurgood Marshall argued that one cannot put a tax on the right to vote "in any form or fashion."
Id. at 1034. He argued that the republican form of the United States government assumed regular
state elections in which all the people would be able to participate. Thus, it made no sense to impose
a poll tax because it would interfere with this democratic process. Id. at 1034-35. He also alluded to
property qualifications as the original barrier for limiting the franchise, and he drew the parallel
between that barrier and poll taxes. Id. at 1034-37. George Gibson, on behalf of the State of Virgin-
ia, argued that the poll tax constituted a minimum requirement that was easily met. Id. at 1053.
Gibson argued that "the dissemination of voter qualifications is exclusively a matter of state concern,
and is to be exercised by the state as they may wish, unless their particular conduct in a particular
situation infringes upon some other constitutional inhibition." Id. at 1054 Because it was a state
concern, he argued there was no need for the Supreme Court to abolish the poll tax since there is no
authority within the Constitution for the Court to do so. He went further to argue that:
[A]n objection based upon payment of one dollar and a half is so insubstantial as to merit dismissal
on that ground alone .... [l]t is found that groups least able to pay a poll tax are also the ones least
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The Court struck down the Virginia poll tax in state elections as a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses. In a majority opinion written by Justice Douglas, the
court reasoned that "once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines
may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."1 23 Though the law did not impli-
cate race and was defensible as policy, the poll tax nonetheless bore no
rational relation to the ability to vote because it singled out wealth as a
qualification for voting.1 24  "Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not
germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral
process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of
race are traditionally disfavored."
1 25
Further, the Court noted that "the Equal Protection Clause is not
shackled to the political theory of a particular era."1 26  The Court
claimed that it never excluded rights to a certain list of guarantees or to
historic notions of equality. The Court cited to Plessy v. Ferguson27 and
Brown v. Board of Education128 as illustrations of how the Court grew
beyond notions of equality or inequality that existed in another era-
here, the "separate but equal" doctrine. 29 The Court was unwilling to
"turn the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was
adopted, or even to 1896" to support an outmoded way of thinking about
the law.' 30 The Court concluded by reiterating that the right to vote
was a fundamental right. "Wealth or fee paying has, in our view, no
relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too
fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned."' 3 1 Thus, the majority
applied a strict scrutiny analysis and declared the poll tax unconstitu-
tional.
Though the majority pronounced the value of the right to vote and
held that its exercise had no relation to one's wealth or financial ability,
three justices dissented from the opinion and articulated a different view
interested in voting. This means that the incidence of the real prevention of voting because of the
dollar and a half requirement is very infrequent.
Id. at 1076. Under Gibson's reasoning, the relative economic conditions of those who are most
burdened by the tax are irrelevant in as much as they do not want to vote anyway. For Gibson, the
purpose the poll tax served was facilitating an effective electoral process. Thus, the tax was tied to
a rational basis and was "the simplest, the most equal, nondiscriminatory and objective test of mini-
mum intelligence and responsibility to be devised." Id. at 1078.
123. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
124. Id. at 666. It is worth mentioning that the court also affirmed the legal principle of the
time that "the ability to read and write.. . has some relation to standards designed to promote intel-
ligent use of the ballot." Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
125. Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.
126. ld. at 669.
127. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1896).
128. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,487-88 (1954).
129. Harper, 383 U.S. at 669-70.
130. Id. at 670.
131. Id.
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of the nature of the right. Justice Black dissented on the grounds that
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to pass
legislation designed to protect the rights listed in the Amendment, and
therefore it was not the place of the Court to strike down the poll tax.
32
Justice Harlan, with whom Justice Stewart joined, dissented on the
grounds that the Court overstepped its powers by declaring the Virginia
poll tax law unconstitutional. They argued that the equal protection
clause does not require equal treatment of all people. What was neces-
sary in evaluating these cases was a determination of whether the action
the state was taking was actually rational or not. Such a judicial phi-
losophy would prevent the judiciary from imposing its own views on
those of policy-makers. 133
Harper is thus marked by the tension between two competing views
as to the nature of the right to vote. The majority view was that Ameri-
can democracy required allowing full access to the right to vote by re-
moving economic barriers to the right to vote. The majority championed
the right to vote by striking down the poll tax. This contrasted with the
dissenters' view: that the right to vote was necessary but not absolute.
Reasonable burdens upon the right to vote are acceptable and should be
left in the judgment of either the states or the coordinate branches of the
federal government despite the cost to be paid by otherwise eligible vot-
ers like Annie Harper. Despite the dissents, the Court held the poll tax
unconstitutional.
Ill. MEASURING THE COST OF VOTING: HARPER, BURDICK, AND
BALANCING ACCESS AND BURDEN
A. The Balancing Test for Burdens on Voting
Harper marked a watershed in American election law. The Court
had, in striking down the poll tax, ruled that one's economic status-as
evidenced by one's ability to pay a tax-had no relation to the right to
vote. Wealth as a status had no bearing on the ability to vote, thus, the
poll tax served to be an invidious factor on which to condition access to
the right to vote. The Court of the Warren Era had articulated a vision of
the right to vote and found at the center of that vision that the right bore
no relation to one's economic status.
Yet after the watershed moment, the high tide of the right to vote
receded. The Court, forced to apply the right to vote to other contexts,
evolved an approach focused not on the fundamental nature of the right
to vote; instead, it articulated a standard that required the balancing of
the interests of the voter in voting with the interests of the government in
administrating fair elections.
132. Id. at 679.
133. Id. at 680-83.
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The Court articulated this approach in two cases, Anderson v. Cele-
brezze134 and Burdick v. Takushi.135 Anderson involved the third-party
candidacy of John Anderson for the Presidency of the United States. Mr.
Anderson had run for, and lost, the Republican Party nomination for
President. Thereafter, and after the early filing deadline had passed for
the Ohio primary, Mr. Anderson attempted to have his name placed on
the ballot as an independent candidate. Anderson proffered a nominating
petition signed by 14,500 residents of Ohio along with a statement of his
candidacy to the Ohio Secretary of State. 136 The Secretary of State re-
fused his petition as untimely. 137 Anderson brought an Equal Protection
challenge asserting that the deadline for independent candidates, which
was different than the deadline for the major parties, was unconstitution-
al because it imposed different burdens on the different kinds of candi-
dates.1 38 The state countered that the qualifications were constitutional
because they met the interests of (1) voter education; (2) equal treatment
for partisan and independent candidates; and (3) political stability.
139
In ruling on this challenge, the Anderson Court took care to note
that not all restrictions on the right to vote warrant strict scrutiny. 140 In-
deed, generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that "protect the
integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself' should be upheld
as constitutional. 41  The Court suggested a balancing test to assess the
constitutionality of a challenged election law to be used on a case-by-
case basis:
[The Court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identi-
fy and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justi-
fications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the
Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of
those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those inter-
ests burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these fac-
134. 460 U.S. 780, 821-22 (1983).
135. 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992).
136. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782.
137. Id. at 782-83.
138. Id. at 783.
139. Id. at 796.
140. See id. at 788 ("Although [certain] rights of voters are fundamental, not all restrictions
imposed by the States on candidates' eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally-suspect bur-
dens on voters' rights to associate or to choose among candidates .... To achieve [fair, honest and
orderly elections], States have enacted comprehensive ... election codes. Each provision of these
schemes, whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility
of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects-at least to some degree-the individu-
al's right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends. Nevertheless, the state's
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory re-
strictions.").
141. Id. at 788 n.9.
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tors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the chal-
lenged provision is unconstitutional. 1
42
After articulating its balancing test, the Court assessed the chal-
lenges that the rule imposed on Anderson and held that the statute in
question burdened an "identifiable segment of Ohio's independent-
minded voters."'143 The burden imposed by Ohio's early filing deadline
was "especially difficult" for the state to justify since it limited "political
participation by an identifiable political group whose members share a
particular viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status.
'' 44
The Court then dismissed the state's proffered interests and found for
Anderson.
Burdick involved a challenge to certain limitations set out in the
Hawaiian write-in ballot law which would prevent certain voters from
casting their ballot preferences. 145 The Court, in upholding the Hawai'i
law, rearticulated the Anderson balancing test for analyzing claims, but
then added an important caveat: that evaluation of the injury to the clai-
mant's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights must precede any balanc-
ing of the claimant's rights against the governmental injury. 
146
The Burdick Court held that this balancing test was the proper ap-
proach for assessing freedom of speech claims based on infringement of
voting rights. 147 The Court has held to this standard for analyzing free
speech voting infringement claims ever since.
148
142. Id. at 789.
143. Id. at 792.
144. Id. at 792-93 (noting that the financial burdens that could be created by filing fees for
candidates could disproportionately affect independent candidates as opposed to major party candi-
dates). The Court, in the context of dealing with an Equal Protection challenge, recognized that
economic impacts can affect the ability of open political participation. Indeed, within the context of
this situation, this represents a freezing of the political status quo because the disproportionate bur-
den on independent candidates effectively helps to insulate the major parties from significant chal-
lenges. Such similar effects could arguably be at play within the voter identification context. Cf
Moran & Wildman, supra note 77, at 1221 (noting how neutrality and equality can support subordi-
nation and hierarchy through protecting property rights and status inequalities inherent in the eco-
nomic system).
145. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992).
146. Id. at 434.
147. Id.
148. The Burdick decision has been criticized by many commentators as confusing and muddy-
ing the analysis of state election laws rather than providing clarity. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 20,
at 491-92 (criticizing the Burdick decision as diluting the otherwise fundamental right to vote; and
confusing due to the fact that it did not rely on right-to-vote cases and failed to define the distinction
between severe burdens on the right to vote and reasonable burdens on the right to vote). This shift
from presuming the right to vote as fundamental and the lack of clarity in effecting the balancing test
set forth in Burdick creates an inability for the test to comprehend the distinction between indirect
costs which create severe burdens on the right to vote and those indirect costs which create a reason-
able burden. This becomes significantly burdensome due to the fact that evidence of burdens in the
photo identification context is difficult to produce and is problematic in terms of the analysis of these
problems. As a result, as is discussed below, the courts are left to rely on the rationales proffered by
the government without an effective counterweight in the Burdick balance. The result is one-sided
opinions which, in the absence of a normative standard, see Flanders, supra note 20, at 97, or statis-
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B. The Evolution of Voter Identification Policy
While Burdick shifted the election administration analysis from the
strict scrutiny of Harper, the technological ability and needs for demon-
strating one's identity also evolved over the thirty years between Harper
and Burdick. With the advent of photographic identification cards came
the ability to present such identification to register and to vote. Howev-
er, a number of other forms of identification were also available which
voters could use to register and vote. These included the presentation of
letters from either the federal or state government bearing the voter's
name or address (including social security information, hunting and fish-
ing licenses, and other types of documentation). State laws concerning
identification found these types of documentation acceptable for over
thirty years.
Moreover, there are those who do not possess government-issued
photographic identification cards. 149 This population of the United States
is shut out of the ability to participate in the activities that are day-to-day
for most citizens (e.g., boarding an airplane, entering a secured building,
etc.). They are also shut out of the ability to cast ballots for political
office.
National policy, nonetheless, has sanctioned, to some extent, the
move for states to require photo identification of voters seeking to regis-
ter. Two major laws passed in the late 1990s and early twenty-first cen-
tury affected this trend. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993,150
or NVRA, required that state governments register voters at various
points where they obtain governmental services, including Motor Ve-
hicles bureaus, Social Security offices, and other points where citizens
would obtain governmental services.15 1 Additionally, the Help America
Vote Act of 2002,152 or HAVA, required that state governments insist
that first-time voters present photographic identification cards when re-
gistering to vote. 153 From these two national initiatives, Congress has
tical proof of which a court can categorize as severe, see Overton, supra note 20, at 672, the courts
tend to side with the state in upholding the identification laws.
149. According to the Brennan Center, twelve percent of eligible voters nationwide do not have
photo IDs. Brennan Center For Justice, Voter ID, http://www.brennancenter.org/content/
section/category/voter-id (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). According to the U.S. Census Bureau, as of
2007, the voting age population estimate was 227,719,424. U.S. Census Bureau, General Demo-
graphic Characteristics, http://tinyuri.con59114r (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). That means that there
are approximately 27.3 million eligible voters without photo IDs.
150. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 1973gg-1 to -10 (West 2009)).
151. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973gg-2 (West 2009).
152. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat 1666 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 15301-15545 (West 2009)).
153. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15483(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (West 2009).
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clearly suggested that voter identification laws are appropriate for use in
modernizing voter registration. 154
Following these imperatives to modernize elections, Georgia, Ari-
zona, Missouri, Michigan, and New Mexico (along with approximately
twenty other states) either have passed or will be passing voter identifica-
tion laws in the near future. 155 Although these laws provide exceptions
for indigent voters to vote based on an affidavit attesting to the voter's
poverty or allowing free identification cards to voters who cannot afford
them, it has been argued that voters must pay an indirect cost for voting
by providing documentation such as a birth certificate, demonstrating
one's residency, or otherwise gathering documentation to obtain the gov-
ernment-issued photographic identification. 156 This article will now turn
to an analysis of how different courts have evaluated voter identification
laws and addressed-if at all-the issue of the economic bias in such
laws.
C. Judicial Analysis of Modem Voter Identification Laws
The voter identification dispute brings to the fore the issue of em-
bedded socioeconomic bias against voters within the electoral system.
As argued earlier, the American republic has consistently looked toward
a socioeconomic indicator, such as the amount of property a free Cauca-
sian man owned, or the ability of a voter to pay a poll tax, as a measure
of whether the citizen has a sufficient stake in the process to be granted
the vote. The intent of these barriers was to exclude those voters that the
majority in power wished to see excluded.
The courts in particular have been apathetic to this concern. Breed-
love represented the Court's apathy towards the problem of states' use of
an economic indicator as a way to discriminate between the desired vot-
ers and the undesirable voters. Harper, in turn, marked a decided shift
from this view and articulated a right to vote that bore no relation to the
ability to pay a tax. Yet, the pendulum has now potentially swung back
to the view that voter identification laws which require photographic
154. Additionally, the Carter-Baker Commission, which was charged by Congress to study
election reform alternatives, suggested that voter ID rules should be used more aggressively as a tool
for registration. See COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S.
ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, at ii (2005), available at
http:llwww.american.edulialcfer/reportlfullreport.pdf. The Commission proposed that all states
require a valid photo ID card for purposes of registering to vote, but only to the extent that it's used
to register new voters instead of allowing the ID to be a barrier to voting. See id. at 18-21. The
Commission suggests that states would play an affirmative role of reaching out to the undeserved
communities by providing them more offices, including mobile ones, to register them and provide
photo IDs free of charge. Id. at 19-20.
155. Twenty-four states have broader identification requirements than those listed in HAVA.
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 50. Seven of these states, Florida, Geor-
gia, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan and South Dakota, require photo ID. Id. The other se-
venteen require ID, but a photo ID is not required. lL
156. See &L (containing a list of voter ID requirements by state and also providing the steps
that voters without photo ID at the time of election need to do to have their vote counted).
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identification-and the prerequisites which have to be fulfilled to meet
that end-will create a new economic bright line, and the Court will re-
treat into apathy towards those effectively removed from the electo-
rate.
157
This debate raises the question of whether the requirements would
actually have a detrimental effect on voters who are of lower socioeco-
nomic status. Indeed, the question of whether any given potential voter's
socioeconomic status is relevant to the issue of determining the impact of
election laws is at the heart of the ongoing debate around voter identifi-
cation laws. Yet, as we have seen, socioeconomic status has been one of
the fulcrums used by those in power to shape the electorate and influence
who can and cannot vote, regardless of the merit of the suggestion. In-
deed, until Harper, these socioeconomic markers were considered to be
an appropriate measure of the ability to participate in the electorate. This
question of the role of socioeconomic status-the ability to show one's
stake in the voting process before one is even admitted to vote-lingers
under the surface of the recent judicial analyses of voter identification
laws.
A number of courts have addressed this issue within the last few
years. Many courts have rejected the argument that voter identification
laws have a harmful impact on the socioeconomically disadvantaged
because they found the evidence lacking of any such impact and, in the
absence of such evidence, that the government's rationale of maintaining
fair elections should be granted deference. This trend represents a return
to the apathy towards the plight of those discriminated against in the poll
tax era and a diminution of the right to vote. The Supreme Court's ruling
in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board shows that the Court has,
potentially, turned away from the principles of Harper.
The Court took the Crawford case from Indiana. The case began
when the state of Indiana passed a photo-identification requirement for
its voters. 158 The law required that all voters in Indiana have the requisite
voter-identification card to vote. Specifically, the Indiana law requires
that only identification issued by either the state of Indiana or the federal
government will qualify to meet the photo-identification requirement.
59
157. This fear has been echoed by many advocates against photo identification laws. They fear
that these laws will exclude otherwise eligible voters on the basis of whether that voter has the
ability to obtain appropriate identification or not since these voters simply do not have the economic
means to obtain the identification. Proponents of photo identification laws contend that these rules
are generally applicable regulations necessary to maintain the validity of federal elections. General-
ly, they argue that the risk of voter fraud is such that stringent voter identification regulations are
necessary and essential to ensure effective and fair elections.
158. Act effective Jul. 1, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2005, 2005 Ind. Acts 2005 (codified at IND.
CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25 (West 2005)), repealed by Act of Mar. 24, 2006, Pub. L. No. 164-2006, sec.
143, 2006 Ind. Legis. Serv. 2006 (West). The requirement has been haled by some as the most
stringent in the land due to its rigorous requirements.
159. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.2(b) (West 2009).
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Thus, those otherwise eligible voters who meet the other registration
requirements and yet have not had the opportunity to obtain the identifi-
cation card would be ineligible to vote. Additionally, the law required a
number of documents be presented to demonstrate the voter's identity.
The Indiana law, Senate Enrolled Bill 483, provides several exceptions
for the identification requirement: (1) if a person is unable or unwilling
to purchase an identification card from the Indiana Bureau of Motor Ve-
hicles, he or she may cast an absentee ballot; (2) elderly people residing
in nursing homes may vote by absentee ballot; and (3) indigent voters
may file an affidavit attesting to the voter's indigent status and cast a
provisional ballot. 16°
The Democratic Party of Indiana sued to enjoin implementation of
the law.16  The Party's theory was that by implementing these voter
standards, the Democratic Party would lose voters that would typically
vote with it. Additionally, in a separate but parallel lawsuit, two Indiana
democratic legislators sued to enjoin the law on substantially the same
grounds.162 The plaintiffs, in essence, argued that the court ought to ap-
ply a strict scrutiny analysis to the law and hold it unconstitutional be-
cause it substantially burdened the fundamental right to vote, dispropor-
tionately affected economically disadvantaged voters by effectively plac-
ing a poll tax upon them, and was not justified by existing circumstances
of voter fraud. 
63
The Indiana photo identification law was upheld by the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The district court held that the
evidence presented to it was not sufficient to enjoin the law in light of the
state's proffered justifications.' 64 The opinion was affirmed by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 165 The majority opinion by
Judge Richard Posner upheld the Indiana statute on the grounds that it
represented a rational interest of the state in preventing voter fraud. In
particular, Judge Posner reasoned that the cost impact on the certain set
of voters is negligible in comparison to the benefits that the law has in
preventing voter fraud. 166 Indeed, Judge Posner reasoned that the inter-
ests of those who may be most directly affected by the law are irrelevant
to the analysis of the law's constitutionality. The majority here believed
that the indirect costs of obtaining photo identification were wholly irre-
levant to the consideration of the impact of the law. 67 The Seventh Cir-
160. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 786 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
161. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1614 (2008) (referring to the
lower court case of Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita).
162. Id.
163. ld. at 1615.
164. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 820.
165. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007).
166. See id. at 952-54.
167. Id. at 952.
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cuit en banc declined to rehear the case.1 68 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
The Supreme Court upheld the Indiana photo identification law in a
fractious 6-3 ruling. The "Lead Opinion" by Justice Stevens performed
the Burdick balancing test and found that the interests of the state in
maintaining the voter-ID law outweighed any impact that the statute
would have on populations who may effectively be disenfranchised by
the law. 169 The Stevens opinion considered the three main bases which
the government proffered to support the law. First, it credited the gov-
ernment's argument that the law was necessary to maintain the integrity
of elections. The Stevens opinion recognized that Indiana had an interest
in modernizing its election process as well as preventing potential voter
fraud in light of such risks as over-inflated voter rolls.
170
In contrast, the Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to present
sufficient evidence on the record to support their assertion that the law
should be struck down on a facial challenge. The Stevens opinion
pointed out that the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate one plaintiff
who had been directly affected by the law. The Stevens opinion also
asserted that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate on the record how many
people actually would be affected by the law. The opinion conceded
that, conceivably, some voters would be effectively shut out by the ina-
bility to register under the structure of the law as written, but it declined
to overturn the law on this basis. The Stevens opinion contended that on
this record, it would be inappropriate to declare the law unconstitutional
simply because some voters may be affected, particularly in light of the
fact that the government had offered justifiable reasons for enacting the
law.
171
The Scalia opinion declined to engage in the lengthy balancing
analysis. Instead, the Scalia opinion contended that the issue was easily
resolved under the principle that this election law was a moderate, rea-
sonable regulation which effectively was only subject to rational basis
review. The Scalia opinion went further to argue that to provide further
analysis to the claims presented would cut against the long, well-settled
168. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 484 F.3d 436, 437 (7th Cir. 2007). Judge
Diane P. Wood, joined by three other judges, dissented from rehearing en banc. Id. The dissenters
to the denial of rehearing en banc contended that the Seventh Circuit majority had ignored the poten-
tial impact of the regulation on individual voters. See id. at 438. Indeed, Judge Wood stressed that
the Supreme Court's precedent in this area did not give license to the view that no one vote matters.
Id. Judge Wood also stressed that the potential impact of the Indiana photo identification law had
not been determined and thus was a question of fact to be determined by the lower court. Id. at 439.
Judge Wood also noted that to the extent these laws completely disenfranchise voters, they
represented the same invidious harm that poll taxes represented. Id. at 438 ("To the extent that [the
photo identification law] operates to turn them away from the polls, it is just as insidious as the poll
taxes and literacy tests that were repudiated long ago.").
169. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616-19 (2008).
170. Id. at 1618-20.
171. Id. at 1620-24.
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precedent of the court that neutral laws of general application ought only
be subject to rational basis review; and that any disparate impact that is
the consequence of such laws is irrelevant to constitutional considera-
tions. Moreover, Justice Scalia joined the lead opinion's view that the
law was founded on reasons which are rational and justified, and there-
fore concurred in the result.
172
The two dissenting opinions took a different view. Justice Souter
(joined by Justice Ginsberg) dissented on the grounds that there was suf-
ficient evidence on the record to demonstrate that the effect would be
substantial on an identifiable set of voters. Justice Souter argued that a
definable number of voters in Indiana would be effected by the law and
unable to vote in an election where the law was in place. 73 Additionally,
Justice Souter contended that the government's overriding rationale for
putting the law in place-the need to prevent voter fraud-was not cred-
ible. Justice Souter contended that there was no established case of voter
fraud in Indiana on which the government could base is rationale of
needing to prevent voter fraud. Justice Souter also contended that the
other basis upon which the rationale was offered had no support and
should not weigh against the actual impact that the law would have. 
174
Justice Breyer dissented separately. Justice Breyer agreed that the
Constitution does not prohibit Indiana from framing voter identification
laws. However, Justice Breyer contended that the burdens on the voters
are substantial and had not been taken into account by the state. Moreo-
ver, Justice Breyer compared the Indiana law to the laws passed by Flor-
ida and Georgia which, in his view, were less restrictive than Indiana's
law. Justice Breyer also substantially relied on the recommendations of
the Carter-Baker report to argue that such substantial burdens on voters
should be avoided. Justice Breyer concluded by realizing that while the
Constitution does not forbid voter identification laws, the Indiana statute
in particular overburdens voters who do not possess the applicable pho-
tographic identification.
175
172. Id. at 1624-27. Justice Scalia's assertion here seems to amount to the suggestion that
voter impact concerns as those raised in the Crawford opinion should be considered purely under a
rational basis review, and that to countenance the application of the balancing test set forth in Bur-
dick would run counter to the anti-disparate impact jurisprudence articulated in such cases as Wash-
ington v. Davis. This line of reasoning is consistent with the Justice's jurisprudence; however, its
discussion in the voting rights context raises a number of concerns. Adoption of this position within
the voting rights arena would substantially change the analysis of voting rights cases concerning
election regulations. It would, taken to an extreme, eviscerate both Burdick and Harper and extend
the influence of Davis into voting rights law and other areas of equal protection jurisprudence. In a
future article, I hope to contemplate the ramifications of this potential change in voting rights juri-
sprudence and its consequential effects on equal protection jurisprudence and voting rights jurispru-
dence in particular.
173. Id. at 1632-34.
174. Id. at 1636-39.
175. Id. at 1643-45.
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Crawford, ultimately, marks another moment where the Court ap-
pears to be at odds concerning the competing visions of democratic par-
ticipation. Yet, in its 6-3 decision, the pendulum has decidedly shifted
from a vision of voter access unfettered that ought not to be defined by
an economic standard. The apparent shift is to a standard where the de-
fault position is one where the government's rationale for election integr-
ity ought to control. Even within this, however, it seems clear that the
Court in itself is not of one mind about this issue. The Stevens opinion
relied on the premise that there was insufficient evidence to support
striking down the Indiana law. The Scalia opinion resisted the notion of
weighing the evidence of voter impact in its entirety. These two opi-
nions represent two different versions of indifference by the Court to-
wards the problem of the economic impact of voter identification laws-
the indifference of insufficient evidence and the apathy of relying solely
on the state's rationale. Both of these markedly contradict the vision in
Harper of a right to vote unfettered by the impact of an economic re-
quirement.
Even prior to Crawford, lower court decisions have also followed a
similar line of analysis. Indeed, the unifying theme in the pre-Crawford
voter identification jurisprudence is the problem of presenting sufficient
evidence of voters being impacted by the identification laws. For exam-
ple, Gonzalez v. Arizona176 dealt with the question of the constitutionality
of Arizona Proposition 200. Proposition 200 required registering voters
to submit evidence of United States citizenship 177 as part of the registra-
tion process. The Gonzalez plaintiffs contended that the rule constituted
a poll tax, severely burdened the fundamental right to vote, and placed a
severe burden on the ability of naturalized citizens' to vote. The Ninth
Circuit rejected each of these claims. First, the Ninth Circuit held that
Proposition 200 was not a poll tax because "voters do not have to choose
between paying a poll tax and providing proof of citizenship when they
register to vote. They only have to provide the proof of citizenship."
' 178
Next, the Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' assertion that Proposition 200
placed a severe burden on the fundamental right to vote by applying the
Burdick test and stating that "appellants have not shown that it is any-
thing other than an even-handed and politically neutral law. The evi-
dence that Arizona citizens may be burdened by the new law consists of
176. 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
177. Id. at 1046. "Satisfactory evidence of citizenship" may be shown by including, with the
voter registration form, any of the following: the number of an Arizona driver's license or no-
operating identification license issued after September 1, 1996; a birth certificate; a copy of a U.S.
passport; or U.S. naturalization documents. This question of satisfactory evidence of citizenship
creates another level of difficulty-and another potential realm where voter identification laws will
have a disparate impact against a protected group, recently naturalized citizens. This topic merits
further study as to the ramifications for naturalized citizens and the exercise of their voting rights
and how these photo identification laws may impact the nature of citizenship in the United States.
178. Id. at 1049.
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declarations from individuals who are not parties to the litigation."
' 179
Finally, the Court disposed of plaintiffs' claims that Proposition 200 dis-
proportionately burdens naturalized citizens by stating simply: "The
record before us ... contains no affidavits or declarations from natura-
lized citizens. Therefore, we do not know the extent to which this re-
quirement may burden.., any such citizen. 180 The Ninth Circuit essen-
tially rejected the plaintiffs' claims that Proposition 200 was unconstitu-
tional because the plaintiffs offered nothing except hypothetical specula-
tion about the harm or burden imposed by Proposition 200.
Similarly, in Common Cause of Georgia v. Billups181 the plaintiffs
sued to challenge the constitutionality of the 2006 Photo ID Act. The
Act required all Georgia voters to obtain a special "Georgia Voter Photo
ID card"182 to vote in state and federal elections. 183 This provision did
not require registering voters to purchase a photo-identification card
from the state. 184 Those who could not obtain Georgia Voter Identifica-
tion Cards could vote via absentee ballot. The Act provided for a place
within the registrar's primary office in each county of the state to process
applications for Georgia Voter Identification Cards and distribute such
cards. The Act also allowed the Georgia Department of Driver Services
("DDS") to register voters and issue voter identification cards. Further,
the Act provided for comprehensive notification and education efforts on
behalf of the state of Georgia to increase awareness of the requirements
of the Act.
The plaintiffs attacked the Act on the grounds that it placed a severe
burden on the voting rights of individuals who either lacked (1) the ne-
179. Id. at 1049-50.
180. Id. at 1050.
181. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups (Common Cause 1/), 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1337
(N.D. Ga. 2007).
182. Id. at 1339.
183. Georgia had previously attempted to implement photo identification requirements, yet
those requirements were struck down as a poll tax. See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups (Com-
mon Cause 1), 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005). Georgia had initially passed a photo identifi-
cation law in 2005 which mandated that every voter purchase and present some form of government-
issued photographic identification to register to vote and prove the voter's identity on Election Day.
Proponents of the law argued that the law served to detour voter fraud and helped to secure elections.
The law passed over the objections of the Georgia Secretary of State, who stated that there was no
voter fraud problem or other election-day oriented security problem which required a photo-ID law.
After the law was passed by the Georgia legislature, the law then gained pre-clearance from the
United States Department of Justice. Id. at 1332-36. The U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia enjoined the law as a violation of the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments to
the Constitution. The court reasoned that the law would create an equal protection violation because
of its requirement that potential voters had to purchase their identification created a group that had
its ability to vote burdened. Moreover, the court in Common Cause I held that the photo identifica-
tion requirement constituted a poll tax because all citizens had to purchase an identification card to
vote, and thus linking the purchase of an identification card to the ability to vote constituted a poll
tax. Id. at 1366-70.
184. The 2006 Photo ID Act "requires the Board of Elections in each county to issue 'Georgia
voter identification card' containing a photograph of the voter, without charge to voters residing in
the county, upon presentation of certain identifying documents." Common Cause H1, 504 F. Supp. 2d
at 1343.
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cessary "identifying documents" 8 5 needed to obtain a Georgia Voter
Identification Cards or (2) transportation to travel to DDS or county regi-
strar offices to obtain the voter identification cards. Plaintiffs also as-
serted that the Act amounted to an unconstitutional poll tax because a
photo ID or proof of residential address was required to procure any of
the "identifying documents" needed to obtain a Georgia Voter Identifica-
tion Card. 186 The Northern District of Georgia applied the Burdick test
and determined that the Act did not create a severe burden on voting
rights because (1) the photo ID cards could be obtained without any
payment to the state; (2) the two named plaintiffs testified that they could
and would travel to their local registrar's office if the Act were to be
upheld; (3) the state of Georgia made efforts to notify and educate voters
who lacked photo ID about the procedures for obtaining a Georgia Voter
Identification Card; and (4) voters who lacked acceptable identification
could vote by casting absentee ballots. On this basis, the court found that
the statute was a reasonable and nondiscriminatory restriction on voting
rights.1 87  A significant part of the Common Cause 11 court's rationale
was none of the named plaintiffs could show the requisite amount of
concrete harm necessary to warrant a strict scrutiny standard of review.
Ultimately the court decided that the Act was not a poll tax and that the
restrictions imposed on fundamental rights were not severe enough to
warrant a type of strict scrutiny review.
1 88
Even outside of the evidentiary context, at least one court has per-
formed a facial analysis of a photo identification requirement and upheld
its constitutionality. In In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding
Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 89 the Michigan House of Representa-
tives asked the Michigan Supreme Court to advise the House about the
constitutionality of pending voter identification legislation. Specifically,
the Michigan legislation would require that voters either present photo
ID or sign an affidavit averring that the voter lacks identification before
185. For a comprehensive listing of "identifying documents," see id. at 1346-48.
186. Id. at 1337.
187. Id. at 1377-80.
188. What is curious about the position of the Common Cause 11 court is its own description of
the operation of the Act itself. See id. at 1342-48, 1355-70. Although the court notes that over
600,000 Georgia residents could be potentially disfranchised, the notice provisions of the Act, the
minimal costs associated with obtaining a Georgia Voter Identification Card and the absentee ballot
exception, proved to be factors that convinced the court to deem the statute a reasonable and nondi-
scriminatory means of combating voter-impersonation fraud. Id. at 1360. Despite former Secretary
of State Cathy Cox's expressed belief that "[tihe Photo ID requirement for in-person voting was
unnecessary, created a significant obstacle to voting for many voters, was unlikely to receive prec-
learance from the Justice Department, violated the Georgia Constitution, and unduly burdened the
right to vote," the court was still disinclined to make the state actually prove (1) the existence of
voter fraud, (2) demonstrate that the Act was narrowly drawn to prevent such fraud, and (3) that
there were no less restrictive alternative means to achieve that end, because the Burdick test dictates
that the plaintiff show actual harm before strict scrutiny review is warranted. Id. at 1357.
189. 740 N.W.2d 444,447 (Mich. 2007).
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voting. The question presented to the court was whether this requirement
created an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote. 190
The Michigan Supreme Court held that (1) under the Burdick stan-
dard, the law was facially constitutional because it was a reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restriction designed to prevent the dilution of votes
and (2) since no voter is required to incur the costs of obtaining a photo
ID as a condition of voting, the identification requirement could not be
characterized as a poll tax. Among other objections, the opposing Attor-
ney General asserted that even if the Court deemed the proposed restric-
tion a reasonable, nondiscriminatory means to prevent voter-
impersonation fraud under the Burdick rational basis standard, the legis-
lature should still be required to make a showing that the voter-
impersonation fraud actually exists and that the restriction is rationally
related to furthering the state's interest in preventing such fraud. The
Court rejected this assertion and held that as long as the restriction is
reasonable and nondiscriminatory, "the state is not required to provide
any proof, much less 'significant proof,' of in-person voter fraud before
it may permissibly take steps to prevent it."191
Not all courts have upheld voter identification laws. For example,
in Weinschenk v. State,192 the Missouri Supreme Court, applying the
state's constitution, struck down the Missouri voter identification law.
The Weinschenk court determined the evidentiary record sufficient to
support an attack on the photo identification laws. On that basis, the
Weinschenk court analyzed the indirect costs imposed by the statue and
found that those costs created an adverse impact on voting.
There, the plaintiff was a disabled woman who sued claiming that
the Missouri photo identification law abridged her ability to vote.' 93 Ms.
Weinschenk sued under both the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution as well as the Missouri State Constitution. The Missouri
Supreme Court found that under Missouri state law, the law was uncons-
190. Generally, 2005 PA 71 requires voters, at each election, to show photo ID to an election
official and execute an application that contains among other identifying information, proof of
address and the voter's mark or signature. If a voter does not possess valid photo ID, the individual
shall sign an affidavit to that effect before an election inspector and be allowed to vote. A voter
allowed to vote without photo ID is subject to challenge by an election official. MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 168.523 (West 2009).
191. Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.w.2d at 459. This case is notable for the clarity
and reasonableness of Judge Cavanaugh's dissent. Judge Cavanaugh asserted that the relevant
inquiry in these types of cases should be "whether, and to what degree, in-person voter fraud would
be addressed by the photo identification requirement," irrespective of the level of scrutiny applied
under the Burdick test. Id. at 474 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting). The dissent questioned whether the
proposed legislation can actually prevent in-person voter fraud when there is no evidence that voter
fraud actually exists in the state of Michigan. Id. at 472-78 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting). Ultimately,
Judge Cavanaugh rejected the proposed legislation as unconstitutional because the burdens imposed
are severe and the operation of the challenge provision of the proposed law itself is subject to abuse
by overzealous election officials.
192. 203 S.w.3d 201, 204 (Mo. 2006).
193. Id. at 208.
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titutional as applied to Ms. Weinschenk and the other plaintiffs in this
lawsuit. 94 The majority in Weinschenk focused on the fact that under
both the federal constitution and the State of Missouri constitutions, the
right to vote qualified as a fundamental right. Thus, the court measured
the nature of the burdens imposed by the photo-identification law under
strict scrutiny.
195
Accordingly, the court found that the burdens imposed on the ability
to vote were great, and the state had not used the least restrictive means
to affect its aim. The court's reasoning focused on the fact that there
were a substantial number of Missourians who did not have federal or
state-issued identification containing a photograph. The court also relied
upon the fact that a number of these residents were either elderly or dis-
abled and thus had little opportunity to gather the documents and creden-
tials necessary to obtain the photo identification card. The court stressed
that materials such as birth certificates, citizenship papers, and other re-
quired documents cost a significant amount of money and time, which
would be difficult for such citizens to expend. The court recognized this
as a cost that effectively would prevent voters-particularly the elderly
and those who did not have such documents-from being able to cast
their vote. 1
96
Another case where a court struck down a voter identification or-
dinance on its face was ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes.197 At issue in San-
tillanes was an amendment to the town charter of the City of Santillanes,
NM which required all who voted in-person at the election polls in mu-
nicipal elections to present a valid and current photo identification card.
This amendment to the city charter was approved by voters. The Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union and others brought suit to enjoin the ordin-
ance. 198 The Santillanes court held that the law was unconstitutional on
its face. It reasoned that the plaintiffs showed a realistic threat to their
legally protected interests in voting in-person. The court went further to
hold that the amendment posed a severe burden on indigent citizens'
right to vote. 199 Thus, according to the court, heightened scrutiny was
merited under Burdick. Under this strict scrutiny analysis, the court
found that the burden imposed by the amendment was not adequately
tailored to further the city's interest in preventing voter-impersonation
fraud.2 °°
In Weinschenk and Santillanes, the courts recognized that the right
to vote was directly burdened by costs created by the state or local gov-
194. Id. at 219.
195. Id. at 216.
196. Id. at 213-15.
197. 506 F. Supp. 2d 598 (D.N.M. 2007).
198. Id. at 605.
199. Id. at 636.
200. Id. at 636-42.
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ernment election laws. The plaintiffs in these cases were able to present
concrete evidence of how the indirect cost generated by obtaining sup-
porting materials to obtain a card frustrated the plaintiff's right to vote.
Nonetheless, the foregoing discussion demonstrates that the con-
flicted apathy towards the right to vote is not only representative in the
Crawford opinions but in the lower courts as well. The lower courts
have, in the absence of direct evidence showing the impact of voter iden-
tification laws, effectively defaulted to the rationale of the government in
implementing these laws. The legal question has significantly shifted to
one of requiring sufficient evidence to support the inference that photo
identification laws effectively disenfranchise potential voters of lower
socioeconomic status. This represents a failure to take into account the
severity of the impact of indirect costs in considering voting. That fail-
ure is, in large part, due to the unfocused structure of the Burdick test. It
is to this problem the article will now turn.
D. The Burdick Sliding Scale and Unfocused Analyses of the Economic
Cost of Voting
Courts applying the Burdick test have tended to discount, in the ab-
sence of significant evidence, the indirect economic costs to be taken into
account when analyzing the effects of voter identification laws. Most
courts considering the issue have adopted a two-part approach: First, the
courts will tend to reject analogies between the direct costs of the poll tax
and the indirect costs brought on by needing to meet the requirements of
obtaining photographic identification. Second, the courts then tend to
rule in favor of the state's interest in maintaining election integrity or
have defaulted towards the state's interest in light of insufficient demon-
strated proof of the economic burden upon voters. These courts, moreo-
ver, have apparently assumed as a starting premise that the indirect costs
imposed by the burdens of narrowed voter identification laws as less
relevant than the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of elections.
Consistently, the courts have defaulted to supporting the state's interests
when considering these laws under a Burdick balancing test.
This inability to account for the indirect costs exasperates the long-
standing problem of economic bias and the requirement of an economic
stake within society in order to exercise the political right to vote. In
essence, voter identification requirements which narrow the list of pre-
scribed voting requirements and thus force voters to obtain the informa-
tion-at substantial cost of time, money, and in some cases, a strain on
the abilities of the voter-create a barrier which the prospective voter
cannot effectively overcome. The ability to accomplish the fulfillment of
these costs acts as a barrier which separates those who are allowed to
vote from those who are not. As such, the economic effect is, as the
Missouri Supreme Court observed, tangible. It is this dynamic which
creates a political underclass of those who cannot, despite being other-
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wise qualified, vote. This is antithetical to a coherent theory of democra-
201
cy.
Such an analysis is often rejected on the grounds that there are only
a miniscule number of voters who are affected by this dynamic. Indeed,
the courts often observe that a balance must be struck between the inter-
ests of the state in administering fair elections with the interests of the
voter in having his or her vote counted fairly.2 °2 This recognition has
been used as a means for courts to ignore the issue of the effects-
whether speculative or actual-of the cost of voter identification cards
upon potential voters. It manifested itself in the eras of property re-
quirements and of poll taxes when the courts would defer to the states'
unfettered ability to set up the qualifications for voting. And it seems
apparent now in the era of voter identification laws.
This is not to diminish the importance of the need to prevent voter
fraud. The integrity of the democratic process is, in itself, an important
and necessary interest to be protected. An election process that does not
possess the basic guarantees which ensure that the votes cast are authen-
tic, are properly counted, and are correctly reported, effectively under-
mines the democratic process. Without basic guarantees which ensure
that those registered are those who actually cast votes, the system will be
subject to immense fraud. All of the courts to decide this issue have
found this to be true. This is a basic tenet of election law.
However, the emphasis of the facts related to voter fraud tends to
focus not on in-person voter impersonation, but on fraud in absentee bal-
lots and problems with electronic voting. The balance of issues related
to integrity through voter identification is, in essence, a solution seeking
a problem. In the absence of actual documented contemporary problems
concerning voter impersonation fraud, courts and legislatures weighing
the implementation and adjudication of voter identification laws should
base their analyses on maintaining the ease with which voters can access
the polls as opposed to abstract notions of voter integrity which lack ac-
tual substantiation.0 3
201. See JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY 4-5
(1992) ("What distinguishes democratic from nondemocratic societies is . . . the way in which power
is acquired and decisions are arrived ...." In particular, Cohen and Arato stress that "[s]o long as
some core set of civil rights is respected and regularly contested elections are held on the basis of a
universal franchise ... a polity can be considered democratic."). Thus, to set forward a form of
constituting the polity that will tend to exclude some segment of it creates doubt in the integrity of
the democratic nature of the institution. This is the problem of the photo ID laws. See also Parson
& Mclaughlin, supra note 20, at 95-96 (noting that voter identification laws coupled with other
."burdensome laws" erode the public's faith in the electoral system).
202. See supra Part Ill.
203. The Burdick balancing seems to create a false dichotomy between the interests of voters in
expressing their First and Fourteenth Amendment free expression rights and the state's interests in
maintaining fair elections. Any democratic government must premise its entire existence on the
notion that the people and their ability to govern is the source of the government's legitimacy. See
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("That to secure these rights, Govern-
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In the end, the interest in election integrity must be balanced with
the interest in ensuring that every otherwise-qualified voter can have
access to the ballot. This is the core premise of American democracy-
that everyone who can rightfully vote should be able to vote. The battle
of access described in this article is ultimately one of ensuring that there
must not be any invidious requirement which prevents voters from vot-
ing. This is the tie that binds us together in our civic society and should
not be easily discounted simply because, as in the voter identification
controversy, only a relative few voters may be affected. °4 It is to this
end of preserving the value of realistically complete access to American
elections for all who are eligible to vote that our laws should be directed.
IV. REFRAMING THE ANALYSIS TO ACCOUNT FOR SOCIOECONoMIc BIAS
The open legal question here is what kind of role should the indirect
cost of voting play within the context of analyzing the burdens presented
by voter identification laws. This article contends that the consequences
of economic status should be taken into account when analyzing voter
identification laws. As a practical matter, this article makes several rec-
ommendations.
First, judicial analysis under either a Burdick balancing test or under
a defined right to vote under a state constitutional scheme needs to weigh
expressly both the direct and the indirect costs of voting within the con-
text of the balancing of the individual voter's rights compared to the in-
terests of the state. The directives of Harper, which note that there
should be no price attached to the ability to exercise the right to vote,
should be interpreted to require courts to strike down voting regulations
which exact unreasonable costs on voting. The calculation of this cost
should include the direct costs-as we can see in the poll tax and those
voter identification laws which have been held unconstitutional because
they required a direct payment from the voter as a precondition of voting.
This calculation should also capture the indirect costs of voting, includ-
ing the need to spend money to obtain the documentation necessary to
ments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed .... ").
Because the consent of the governed is the bedrock of democracy generally, and the founding source
of American democracy in particular, it is a strange juxtaposition to set at odds the interests of the
governed against the interests of the government. This vision of voting rights-which sets the rights
of the people at odds with the government itself-is a major contributing factor to the antidemocratic
results we see in the majority of the photo identification cases. A better way to frame the Burdick
test as well as to think about this issue of democratic process would be to set the people's interest in
voting as the first and most important interest the government possesses in administrating elections.
Once seen through this lens, the ability to better construct and consider the costs of voting upon the
voter and how that frustrates voter participation would become clearer.
204. This is because these requirements will exclude voters from the process and thus obstruct
their core political rights as citizens. See Overton, supra note 20, at 673-74 ("Photo-identification
requirements that exclude legitimate voters interfere with the ability of citizens to identify with one
another as a political community, create alliances with others of different backgrounds, and use the
vote instrumentally to enact political change.").
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vote, as well as the time loss and potential employment loss and travel
costs to obtain the voter ID. This analysis should occur in the first in-
stance rather than waiting for a preliminary showing of substantial harm
by the plaintiff prior to determining the level of scrutiny to which the law
may be subject.
In other words, there ought to be a reordering of the Burdick test in
light of the Harper rationale. Rather than a balancing test that defaults to
the interests of the state, the test should be structured to require the state
to demonstrate that the means it has adopted in its voter identification
laws represent a significant interest in preventing voter fraud coupled
with a showing that the conditional costs-direct and indirect-to the
voter are minimized in the scheme the government is implementing.
Those costs ought to be presumed to affect voting; thus the government
should demonstrate that its rules account for the indirect costs and pro-
vide alternatives which will minimize those costs. Once it has done so, it
would be up to the plaintiffs to disprove the government's proof.
In a larger sense, courts should take into account the complexity
that surrounds voting when considering voter identification laws and
laws that condition voting generally. The political science literature
shows us that it is these kinds of restrictions which influence whether
voters will actually participate in the electoral process. Moreover, it is
the amount of economic stake required to vote-and its susceptibility to
manipulation by the political majorities-which forms the backbone of
the historical evil of the poll tax. Similarly, this same susceptibility is at
play here with the voter identification laws when one focuses on the so-
cioeconomic forces which underlie the tax. As such, the effect of the
policy consequences of relating the choice of applying a voter registra-
tion regime which depends upon the socioeconomic status of the poten-
tial voter creates a dynamic where policy makers can choose what electo-
rate they may wish to have or not wish to have. Because of this, the abil-
ity to vote becomes subject to a kind of tyranny of the majority which
runs counter to the notion of what the vote is for-to allow each and
every citizen to make their voice heard.
As seen above, judicial analyses have tended to only look at wheth-
er there was a literal cost of the poll tax or something comparable. In-
deed, most jurisdictions when analyzing the burdens have simply dis-
missed even the specter of costs outside of the direct costs as irrelevant
to the analysis. This reduction of this crucial issue to virtual irrelevancy
will cause courts to miss the point completely concerning the socioeco-
nomic effects of voter identification laws. Moreover, a policy of adopt-
ing an express analysis of both the direct and indirect costs of the vote
and thus preventing such costs from escaping scrutiny in analyzing vot-
ing laws will move election laws one step further towards formulating a
uniform right to vote which is not bound by socioeconomic biases or the
whims of a potentially tyrannical majority.
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The challenge is finding a method for courts to engage in this analy-
sis. Finding the answer is difficult in as much as courts have tended not
to be persuaded by purely statistical analyses showing the degree of citi-
zens who would be plausibly affected by the economic bias. For exam-
ple, as an evidentiary matter, the trial court in Crawford rejected the re-
search proffered by the experts. As explained earlier, other courts have
rejected analyses based on statistical evidence. Moreover, as the Craw-
ford case showed, it is difficult to find the live plaintiff directly affected
by these rules because such citizens are virtually invisible. Yet, the
Weinschenk decision demonstrates that such statistical analyses-
coupled with an identifiable plaintiff who had been effectively excluded
by the laws-would provide a basis sufficient for a court to strike down
the law. Plaintiffs and courts ought to look towards this example of evi-
dentiary sufficiency as a model for future cases.
Moreover, one of the difficulties illustrated across the history of the
vote is the fact that within both the federal system and each state system
are different standards of qualifications to vote. Indeed, as seen in Wein-
schenk, the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted the Missouri Constitu-
tion to reach the result that the voter identification laws at issue in that
case created too great of an infringement on the right to vote. Yet, given
that Missouri appears to have relied on state law rather than federal law,
other states have ruled that such laws are constitutional; and given that
over half of the states have yet to consider the issue, it seems important
to establish a clear uniform interpretation of these laws to ensure that the
balance between election integrity and voter access are met. The only
way to ensure uniformity of such laws is, in the long term, to explicitly
define in affirmative terms what the right to vote means and how it
should be interpreted in relation to voter identification laws and other
relevant rules. Congress, through HAVA and the NVRA, has made
some suggestions as to both the validity of voter identification laws and
the need for uniform standards. Those suggestions seem to bend in the
interests of ensuring efficiency of elections and ensuring their fairness.
This work should continue; it should also take into account the socioeco-
nomic bias discussed here.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the manipulation of the costs of voting
is the steady, consistent theme which underlies both the anti-democratic
history of the right to vote as well as the future threat presented by photo
identification requirements as prerequisites for voting. Such lines of
exclusion are antithetical to the nature of democracy and ultimately con-
stitute a tyranny of the majority against the minority at the lowest level
of socioeconomic status. In light of this, judicial and legislative analyses
of these laws should focus on the indirect costs of voting and how those
costs potentially exclude voters. Only in this way will we be able to
create an enduring and greater character for American democracy.
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